WEBVTT 0 00:00:00.129 --> 00:00:03.210 Putin uses the military term the fifth column to describe the 1 00:00:03.210 --> 00:00:06.550 people who are secretly helping Ukraine to fight Russia from within. 2 00:00:06.969 --> 00:00:10.119 And according to a new Wall Street Journal investigation that just came out, 3 00:00:10.369 --> 00:00:14.609 Ukrainian intelligence is currently recruiting thousands of Russian soldiers to 4 00:00:14.609 --> 00:00:18.159 spy on their own military and sabotage their own operations. 5 00:00:18.530 --> 00:00:21.569 They're running a massive coordinated covert campaign to 6 00:00:21.569 --> 00:00:24.250 build a 5th column of agents inside Russia. 7 00:00:24.610 --> 00:00:26.850 Putin has called them national traitors and 8 00:00:26.850 --> 00:00:28.610 said that society needs to cleanse itself. 9 00:00:28.940 --> 00:00:29.559 of them, 10 00:00:29.700 --> 00:00:33.060 because the consequences have already been devastating for the Kremlin, 11 00:00:33.259 --> 00:00:36.479 with just one Russian lieutenant alone providing intelligence 12 00:00:36.659 --> 00:00:39.409 that helped Ukrainian forces kill more than 300 13 00:00:39.409 --> 00:00:42.540 Russian troops and stall advances across the front. 14 00:00:42.740 --> 00:00:45.869 It's the largest defection campaign since World War II 15 00:00:46.099 --> 00:00:49.169 that has even seen a high ranking Russian colonel switch sides. 16 00:00:49.459 --> 00:00:49.860 So today, 17 00:00:49.939 --> 00:00:52.889 I want to investigate why Russian troops keep defecting, 18 00:00:53.139 --> 00:00:55.279 how Ukrainian intelligence recruits them, 19 00:00:55.610 --> 00:00:57.419 and why this is actually part of a much. 20 00:00:57.549 --> 00:00:58.909 More ambitious plan. 21 00:00:59.150 --> 00:00:59.909 I'm Chris Cappy. 22 00:00:59.990 --> 00:01:03.169 Fire off a round at the like and subscribe button and let's find out. 23 00:01:03.430 --> 00:01:03.869 Right now, 24 00:01:03.970 --> 00:01:07.309 Ukrainian intelligence operatives from the HUR are secretly 25 00:01:07.309 --> 00:01:10.410 communicating with thousands of Russians across the border 26 00:01:10.550 --> 00:01:13.099 through social media and encrypted messaging apps. 27 00:01:13.269 --> 00:01:15.900 And according to the detailed Wall Street Journal investigation, 28 00:01:16.190 --> 00:01:18.449 their contacts range from who you might not expect, 29 00:01:18.550 --> 00:01:22.330 like Russian housewives who live near military facilities and factories 30 00:01:22.669 --> 00:01:26.190 to Russian intelligence officers and active duty soldiers across the front. 31 00:01:26.919 --> 00:01:30.940 and their long-term ambitious plan for growing this network 32 00:01:31.160 --> 00:01:31.779 is pretty 33 00:01:32.040 --> 00:01:32.599 huge. 34 00:01:32.839 --> 00:01:36.709 Ukrainian intelligence hopes to cultivate a larger and larger pool of Russian 35 00:01:36.709 --> 00:01:39.000 defectors who could eventually form an 36 00:01:39.000 --> 00:01:41.540 armed resistance movement inside Russia itself. 37 00:01:41.839 --> 00:01:44.800 Their larger goal is potentially to create the conditions 38 00:01:44.800 --> 00:01:47.919 that could eventually help overthrow Putin's government from within. 39 00:01:48.080 --> 00:01:50.269 And this is already happening on a much smaller scale. 40 00:01:50.319 --> 00:01:52.639 We've seen Russian anti-Kremlin fighters have 41 00:01:52.639 --> 00:01:54.959 launched armed incursions across Russia's borders. 42 00:01:55.300 --> 00:01:58.129 Using armored vehicles and infantry to attack Russian 43 00:01:58.129 --> 00:02:00.849 military positions across the border in Belgorod. 44 00:02:01.050 --> 00:02:03.650 These groups have openly talked about eventually bringing 45 00:02:03.650 --> 00:02:06.470 their war against Putin deeper into Russian territory. 46 00:02:06.730 --> 00:02:09.160 But one of the most valuable Russian officers 47 00:02:09.330 --> 00:02:11.889 that Ukrainian intelligence ever managed to recruit 48 00:02:12.009 --> 00:02:15.009 was an active duty lieutenant Lev Stupnikov. 49 00:02:15.250 --> 00:02:19.210 Moscow trained Lieutenant Stupnikov as a communications officer and gave him 50 00:02:19.210 --> 00:02:22.250 valuable information that even Ukraine's extensive 51 00:02:22.250 --> 00:02:23.770 surveillance drones could never reach. 52 00:02:24.380 --> 00:02:26.839 The secret intelligence that he would eventually reveal 53 00:02:27.009 --> 00:02:30.360 would have an operational level impact on the course of the war. 54 00:02:30.539 --> 00:02:32.899 The unusual part is that the person who helped bring 55 00:02:32.899 --> 00:02:36.119 him into the Ukrainian intelligence network was his own mother. 56 00:02:36.300 --> 00:02:38.220 The origins of a defector can sometimes be 57 00:02:38.220 --> 00:02:40.369 surprising and not who you'd always expect, 58 00:02:40.580 --> 00:02:42.339 because he actually always wanted to be a 59 00:02:42.339 --> 00:02:44.770 Russian military officer ever since he was young. 60 00:02:44.979 --> 00:02:45.660 As a teenager, 61 00:02:45.779 --> 00:02:49.880 Lev Stupnikov entered a military communications academy in Saint Petersburg 62 00:02:50.020 --> 00:02:52.520 and swore an oath to defend the Russian country. 63 00:02:52.789 --> 00:02:53.470 He had a wife, 64 00:02:53.550 --> 00:02:55.979 he had big plans to start a family in Russia, 65 00:02:56.199 --> 00:02:57.500 and he had a long, 66 00:02:57.550 --> 00:02:58.869 respectable career ahead of him. 67 00:02:59.070 --> 00:03:00.979 Then the Russian military applied its, 68 00:03:01.270 --> 00:03:01.789 let's say, 69 00:03:01.949 --> 00:03:03.910 unique approach to soldier retention. 70 00:03:04.149 --> 00:03:07.130 He saw corruption throughout his career right from the very beginning, 71 00:03:07.470 --> 00:03:10.050 with rundown armored vehicles that were rusty, 72 00:03:10.229 --> 00:03:12.110 to when he tried to join flight school, 73 00:03:12.320 --> 00:03:14.660 they demanded a bribe from him just to get in. 74 00:03:14.820 --> 00:03:16.589 And so when Russia invaded Ukraine, 75 00:03:16.679 --> 00:03:19.740 he watched airstrikes on Ukrainian civilians and cities and. 76 00:03:20.279 --> 00:03:22.160 While his fellow officers praised the war, 77 00:03:22.240 --> 00:03:25.820 he had to do a kind of double speak and pretend to agree with it. 78 00:03:26.000 --> 00:03:27.470 In November 2023, 79 00:03:27.679 --> 00:03:31.130 that's when he was sent an order in the mail that stated he was to go and quote, 80 00:03:31.399 --> 00:03:32.919 replace casualties on the front line. 81 00:03:33.080 --> 00:03:37.000 A job description that says that the last guy that had the job is dead is pretty rough. 82 00:03:37.119 --> 00:03:40.919 His mother urged him to flee during a stop that he had in Moscow, 83 00:03:41.199 --> 00:03:44.820 where he had this chance to leave to go to Kazakhstan out of the country 84 00:03:45.279 --> 00:03:47.100 where he had family there that he could stay with. 85 00:03:47.240 --> 00:03:47.679 But he did. 86 00:03:47.770 --> 00:03:51.130 He didn't want his family to deal with the legal consequences of desertion, 87 00:03:51.490 --> 00:03:56.169 so he deployed to the Russian 36 guard motor rifle brigade near Volodar. 88 00:03:56.369 --> 00:03:59.110 This was an extremely important town on the front line 89 00:03:59.250 --> 00:04:02.679 where Putin was growing everything he had at the time in 2024. 90 00:04:03.009 --> 00:04:03.330 There, 91 00:04:03.490 --> 00:04:05.440 he became the battalion communications chief, 92 00:04:05.649 --> 00:04:06.990 which made him a huge 93 00:04:07.369 --> 00:04:10.130 and valuable target for Ukrainian intelligence. 94 00:04:10.289 --> 00:04:12.809 The way Ukrainian intelligence was finding these Russian 95 00:04:12.809 --> 00:04:15.169 defectors and recruiting them is pretty fascinating. 96 00:04:15.550 --> 00:04:16.309 To dive deeper, 97 00:04:16.390 --> 00:04:18.940 we'll analyze this story with ground news about how 98 00:04:18.940 --> 00:04:21.899 China's opening up a new military-role airfield in Laos. 99 00:04:22.160 --> 00:04:24.339 About 90 sources have covered this story, 100 00:04:24.549 --> 00:04:26.910 so sorting through that amount of coverage has been a 101 00:04:26.910 --> 00:04:29.579 nightmare because depending on which outlet I'm looking at, 102 00:04:29.820 --> 00:04:31.859 I get a completely different version of events. 103 00:04:32.109 --> 00:04:33.510 That's why I use Ground News, 104 00:04:33.670 --> 00:04:34.429 today's sponsor, 105 00:04:34.709 --> 00:04:36.589 because they're the best tool for my whole team 106 00:04:36.589 --> 00:04:38.910 and I to stay objective with our reporting. 107 00:04:39.230 --> 00:04:39.920 On this story, 108 00:04:40.029 --> 00:04:43.500 Ground News lets me instantly see which headlines to focus on. 109 00:04:43.640 --> 00:04:46.339 It's the same story with two different realities. 110 00:04:46.519 --> 00:04:47.350 But with Ground News, 111 00:04:47.420 --> 00:04:49.200 I cut through all of that because they 112 00:04:49.200 --> 00:04:52.399 pull in coverage from local and international sources, 113 00:04:52.630 --> 00:04:54.880 and then they put it in one easy to read feed, 114 00:04:55.149 --> 00:04:57.579 letting me quickly see every angle of the story 115 00:04:57.720 --> 00:04:58.589 and get the truth. 116 00:04:58.839 --> 00:05:02.440 And the color-coded layout makes it easy to filter for high factuality sources. 117 00:05:02.859 --> 00:05:06.670 See political bias or filter for the geographic region of each source. 118 00:05:06.970 --> 00:05:08.609 I'm developing stories like this one, 119 00:05:08.690 --> 00:05:11.549 Ground News gives me clarity that you don't find anywhere else. 120 00:05:11.970 --> 00:05:13.609 Because I believe in Ground news so much, 121 00:05:13.730 --> 00:05:18.429 we're offering you 40% off the same vantage plan that my team and I use here 122 00:05:18.970 --> 00:05:19.970 for my research. 123 00:05:20.089 --> 00:05:23.850 Just click the link in the description or go to ground.news/cappy. 124 00:05:24.049 --> 00:05:25.200 Give Ground News a shot. 125 00:05:25.329 --> 00:05:28.329 One of the people helping Helping recruit them was Dmytro Karpenko, 126 00:05:28.380 --> 00:05:29.959 who's a Ukrainian programmer 127 00:05:30.140 --> 00:05:33.279 who posted interviews with captured Russian soldiers on YouTube. 128 00:05:33.540 --> 00:05:36.359 Some prisoners actually later were released from prison 129 00:05:36.700 --> 00:05:40.179 in prisoner exchanges and returned back home to Russia, 130 00:05:40.339 --> 00:05:42.859 and then they later contacted Karpenko, 131 00:05:43.019 --> 00:05:44.079 offering to sell him 132 00:05:44.329 --> 00:05:45.450 military secrets. 133 00:05:45.660 --> 00:05:47.619 He was turning his YouTube audience into a 134 00:05:47.619 --> 00:05:49.519 source of intelligence on the Russian army. 135 00:05:49.920 --> 00:05:52.119 So Karpenko in Ukraine publicly offered 136 00:05:52.119 --> 00:05:55.309 around 2700 bucks for useful intelligence. 137 00:05:55.600 --> 00:05:59.269 He was juggling a dozen different smartphones from roughly 40 138 00:05:59.269 --> 00:06:03.040 different accounts and receiving messages from Russian energy workers, 139 00:06:03.109 --> 00:06:04.989 alleged FSB insiders, 140 00:06:05.040 --> 00:06:06.220 their security service, 141 00:06:06.480 --> 00:06:10.000 and even grandmothers and mothers who were just worried about their sons. 142 00:06:10.079 --> 00:06:12.760 Imagine running a customer service department for defection, 143 00:06:12.880 --> 00:06:13.760 that's what he was doing. 144 00:06:13.920 --> 00:06:16.799 And that's how Lieutenant Stupnikov was recruited 145 00:06:16.799 --> 00:06:18.959 because his mother had contacted Karpenko. 146 00:06:19.031 --> 00:06:19.460 Ukraine, 147 00:06:19.580 --> 00:06:21.270 hoping that he could help her son escape. 148 00:06:21.460 --> 00:06:24.371 Stupnikov recognized the name because he'd already watched 149 00:06:24.371 --> 00:06:26.881 dozens of his prisoner interviews on YouTube. 150 00:06:27.151 --> 00:06:29.911 Bizarre to think that that's how intelligence officers build trust 151 00:06:29.911 --> 00:06:33.191 today with contacts by building a resume of previous defections, 152 00:06:33.270 --> 00:06:34.691 this way they know you can eventually 153 00:06:34.990 --> 00:06:35.531 trust them. 154 00:06:35.710 --> 00:06:37.131 So Stupnikov reached out 155 00:06:37.330 --> 00:06:39.330 through WhatsApp and offered to cooperate. 156 00:06:39.430 --> 00:06:40.950 Karpenko offered him money, 157 00:06:41.191 --> 00:06:42.071 but surprisingly, 158 00:06:42.110 --> 00:06:44.420 the Russian lieutenant Stupnikov refused. 159 00:06:44.710 --> 00:06:46.770 He said he just wanted help getting out of the war. 160 00:06:47.230 --> 00:06:48.110 And so in February. 161 00:06:48.252 --> 00:06:49.101 2024, 162 00:06:49.221 --> 00:06:53.962 Russia's 36th Brigade gathered at a training ground in occupied Donetsk, 163 00:06:54.182 --> 00:06:56.861 where senior officers were visiting before this 164 00:06:56.861 --> 00:06:59.571 major offensive push was supposed to happen. 165 00:06:59.791 --> 00:07:00.062 Of course, 166 00:07:00.191 --> 00:07:01.932 Stupnikov was right there with them, 167 00:07:02.221 --> 00:07:04.661 so he secretly took photographs on his phone 168 00:07:04.661 --> 00:07:07.481 of this formation of over 100 Russian infantry 169 00:07:07.701 --> 00:07:11.022 just standing out in the open in eastern Ukraine near the front line. 170 00:07:11.221 --> 00:07:15.721 Then he sent his exact coordinates and location to his Ukrainian handler. 171 00:07:15.981 --> 00:07:17.302 Then Stupnikov instantly. 172 00:07:17.412 --> 00:07:19.372 He gets a text message on his phone that says, 173 00:07:19.412 --> 00:07:20.053 get out of there. 174 00:07:20.173 --> 00:07:23.023 Then another message that reads in all capital letters, 175 00:07:23.213 --> 00:07:23.673 leave. 176 00:07:23.972 --> 00:07:26.493 Then Stupnikov made an excuse about needing to use the 177 00:07:26.493 --> 00:07:28.752 bathroom so he could walk away from the formation. 178 00:07:28.972 --> 00:07:30.812 He made it out of the kill zone right 179 00:07:30.812 --> 00:07:34.433 in time before Ukrainian missiles slammed into the formation. 180 00:07:34.653 --> 00:07:36.483 It reportedly knocked him back on his feet, 181 00:07:36.542 --> 00:07:37.572 he was so close to it, 182 00:07:37.842 --> 00:07:39.812 and it killed 68 Russian troops, 183 00:07:40.092 --> 00:07:41.523 including his brigade commander, 184 00:07:41.532 --> 00:07:42.912 and wounded dozens more. 185 00:07:43.292 --> 00:07:46.532 BBC's Russian service and other outlets documented the huge. 186 00:07:46.644 --> 00:07:47.433 Strike at the time, 187 00:07:47.604 --> 00:07:49.843 it was seen as a sign of Russia's military 188 00:07:49.843 --> 00:07:52.963 incompetence that analysts couldn't figure out at the time. 189 00:07:53.123 --> 00:07:56.984 The Russian lieutenant Stupnikov then helped load casualties afterward, 190 00:07:57.204 --> 00:07:58.634 and he pretended to be injured so that 191 00:07:58.634 --> 00:08:00.764 they wouldn't suspect him of being the defector. 192 00:08:00.963 --> 00:08:03.683 Russian investigators from the FSB checked phones 193 00:08:03.683 --> 00:08:05.324 and questioned all of the survivors, 194 00:08:05.523 --> 00:08:06.104 including him, 195 00:08:06.523 --> 00:08:10.164 but he managed to keep his cool and erase no suspicion, 196 00:08:10.364 --> 00:08:11.503 at least originally. 197 00:08:11.843 --> 00:08:13.783 Since his position was high up enough 198 00:08:13.924 --> 00:08:15.084 and his role required it, 199 00:08:15.204 --> 00:08:15.683 he was able to. 200 00:08:15.875 --> 00:08:17.714 Continue supplying troop movements, 201 00:08:17.834 --> 00:08:18.915 radio information, 202 00:08:19.195 --> 00:08:21.625 and attack plans to Ukrainian intelligence. 203 00:08:21.954 --> 00:08:23.554 Due to the intel that he passed along, 204 00:08:23.635 --> 00:08:27.595 the Ukrainians could easily anticipate different Russian assaults and target 205 00:08:27.595 --> 00:08:30.755 vulnerable concentrations as they were trying to hit Volodar. 206 00:08:30.954 --> 00:08:35.455 It's part of the reason why each Russian armored assault in Volodar in 2024 207 00:08:35.554 --> 00:08:39.395 kept getting destroyed each time they tried to attack from a secret direction. 208 00:08:39.674 --> 00:08:42.094 Part of the reason the assaults were failing is because 209 00:08:42.515 --> 00:08:43.614 Ukrainian forces 210 00:08:43.715 --> 00:08:44.875 had a man on the inside. 211 00:08:45.200 --> 00:08:46.650 The most important insight here, 212 00:08:46.690 --> 00:08:46.969 I think, 213 00:08:46.979 --> 00:08:49.789 is that he had a relatively cushy job. 214 00:08:50.080 --> 00:08:53.280 Stupnikov wasn't on the front line assigned to assaults. 215 00:08:53.450 --> 00:08:58.229 He probably could have gotten away with not being in major danger for most of the war 216 00:08:58.729 --> 00:08:59.469 because of this, 217 00:08:59.650 --> 00:09:03.010 and just worked his way up to safer and safer ranks. 218 00:09:03.330 --> 00:09:05.799 But he felt so disgusted by the war, 219 00:09:06.090 --> 00:09:07.530 he wanted no part in it. 220 00:09:07.929 --> 00:09:12.119 But that is just the beginning of what Lev Stupnikov was about to do from here. 221 00:09:12.380 --> 00:09:13.840 These kind of defections 222 00:09:13.979 --> 00:09:17.049 have had enormous consequences in wars throughout history, 223 00:09:17.179 --> 00:09:18.609 just like what he's about to do. 224 00:09:18.859 --> 00:09:19.900 During World War One, 225 00:09:20.049 --> 00:09:23.900 roughly 2 million Russian soldiers deserted their posts in 1917, 226 00:09:24.140 --> 00:09:26.669 contributing to the collapse of the Imperial Russian Army. 227 00:09:26.729 --> 00:09:29.119 Decades later during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, 228 00:09:29.539 --> 00:09:33.020 some Soviet soldiers actually defected and joined the Afghan resistance. 229 00:09:33.340 --> 00:09:36.940 That's why there is a military term for people secretly working with the. 230 00:09:37.135 --> 00:09:38.804 Enemy from inside their own country. 231 00:09:38.984 --> 00:09:40.184 It's called the fifth column. 232 00:09:40.304 --> 00:09:43.484 The phrase originally comes from the Spanish Civil War in 1936, 233 00:09:43.625 --> 00:09:44.924 and according to the famous story, 234 00:09:45.054 --> 00:09:46.255 Four column of rebels, 235 00:09:46.625 --> 00:09:48.255 they were advancing toward Madrid, 236 00:09:48.505 --> 00:09:50.505 but a nationalist general claimed that there 237 00:09:50.505 --> 00:09:52.705 was a secret fifth column already inside the 238 00:09:52.705 --> 00:09:54.585 city made up of sympathizers who were 239 00:09:54.585 --> 00:09:57.044 prepared to undermine its defenses from within. 240 00:09:57.304 --> 00:10:00.244 What Russian Lieutenant Stupnikov is about to go through 241 00:10:00.505 --> 00:10:04.544 shows just how much damage one insider in this fifth column can really do. 242 00:10:05.744 --> 00:10:06.145 The Wall Street. 243 00:10:06.309 --> 00:10:10.219 Journal investigation describes more attacks that were very surprising. 244 00:10:10.460 --> 00:10:13.609 It's wild how much damage one single defector can do 245 00:10:13.609 --> 00:10:15.780 in the right place to a whole war effort. 246 00:10:16.039 --> 00:10:16.450 I think 247 00:10:16.710 --> 00:10:18.390 more than millions of dollars' worth of 248 00:10:18.390 --> 00:10:20.969 fancy long-range missiles or fighter jets sometimes. 249 00:10:21.349 --> 00:10:22.070 In another attack, 250 00:10:22.150 --> 00:10:25.619 he identified another large gathering of Russian brigade officers. 251 00:10:25.869 --> 00:10:29.750 Ukrainian forces struck the gathering and killed several more Russian officers, 252 00:10:29.909 --> 00:10:32.010 further weakening the brigade's command structure. 253 00:10:32.270 --> 00:10:33.270 Then a few months later, 254 00:10:33.349 --> 00:10:35.349 Ukrainian intelligence learned that two Russian. 255 00:10:35.505 --> 00:10:39.135 Assault units were sheltering inside the basement of a former hotel. 256 00:10:39.635 --> 00:10:41.794 Another Ukrainian strike hit that building, 257 00:10:41.914 --> 00:10:43.544 killing 20 more Russian soldiers, 258 00:10:43.755 --> 00:10:44.594 including their captain. 259 00:10:44.715 --> 00:10:47.304 This set them back a ton because the soldiers in 260 00:10:47.304 --> 00:10:49.794 that basement were supposed to take part in assaults. 261 00:10:49.835 --> 00:10:51.184 They were meant to take ground. 262 00:10:51.354 --> 00:10:54.534 The officers organizing these attacks were becoming targets themselves. 263 00:10:55.075 --> 00:10:58.354 Ukraine was reaching inside the enemy's planning cycle before 264 00:10:58.354 --> 00:11:00.715 the Russians ever even reached the starting line. 265 00:11:01.075 --> 00:11:04.554 Constantly replacing experienced infantrymen is a very expensive. 266 00:11:04.869 --> 00:11:05.890 way to run an army. 267 00:11:06.109 --> 00:11:09.419 Stupnikov helped identify a Russian brigade command post 268 00:11:09.640 --> 00:11:12.020 where senior officers were holding a meeting, 269 00:11:12.119 --> 00:11:14.679 and Ukrainian forces struck that location too. 270 00:11:15.000 --> 00:11:17.799 He was passing information about exactly when 271 00:11:17.799 --> 00:11:19.669 Russian tanks were preparing to advance, 272 00:11:20.039 --> 00:11:22.070 which units were assigned to the assaults, 273 00:11:22.400 --> 00:11:23.950 and their radio frequencies. 274 00:11:24.190 --> 00:11:27.340 Think about the advantage that gives Ukrainian defenders 275 00:11:27.520 --> 00:11:30.159 when they know the enemy's attack plans long before even 276 00:11:30.159 --> 00:11:32.599 the Russian infantrymen carrying them out know about it. 277 00:11:32.669 --> 00:11:33.179 At the time, 278 00:11:33.239 --> 00:11:33.799 it looked like. 279 00:11:33.885 --> 00:11:35.405 Russia wasn't learning anything, 280 00:11:35.525 --> 00:11:38.544 just throwing armored vehicles into full frontal assaults 281 00:11:38.804 --> 00:11:40.385 with no thought on their part, 282 00:11:40.645 --> 00:11:42.784 but part of the reason it was happening was because 283 00:11:43.044 --> 00:11:44.424 their entire plan was given away. 284 00:11:44.525 --> 00:11:47.804 So Stupnikov also disabled surveillance cameras and 285 00:11:47.804 --> 00:11:50.625 tampered with batteries on Russian drone controllers 286 00:11:50.844 --> 00:11:53.114 that would overheat and fail during missions, 287 00:11:53.674 --> 00:11:55.924 which must have made for a pretty fascinating 288 00:11:55.924 --> 00:11:58.125 conversation with the military IT supply department. 289 00:11:58.325 --> 00:12:00.684 But every act of sabotage gave Russian 290 00:12:00.684 --> 00:12:03.005 counterintelligence another chance to catch him. 291 00:12:03.239 --> 00:12:07.080 It must have been extremely nerve-wracking to do those sabotage missions, 292 00:12:07.400 --> 00:12:11.080 cause if he was caught doing anything even just a little bit slightly suspicious, 293 00:12:11.359 --> 00:12:13.479 messing with a battery or sending a text message, 294 00:12:13.559 --> 00:12:14.580 he was screwed. 295 00:12:14.799 --> 00:12:16.719 According to the Wall Street Journal investigation, 296 00:12:16.840 --> 00:12:20.679 Ukrainian intelligence attributed more than 300 Russian deaths 297 00:12:20.919 --> 00:12:23.400 to information supplied by that one lieutenant. 298 00:12:23.520 --> 00:12:24.039 But on the other hand, 299 00:12:24.150 --> 00:12:27.260 every successful strike left these Russian commanders wondering, 300 00:12:27.479 --> 00:12:29.859 how does Ukraine keep finding their positions 301 00:12:29.960 --> 00:12:30.799 with drones. 302 00:12:31.075 --> 00:12:32.455 Forming the battlefield at the time, 303 00:12:32.804 --> 00:12:35.184 they naturally suspected Ukrainian reconnaissance 304 00:12:35.184 --> 00:12:37.215 drones or intercepted communications, 305 00:12:37.275 --> 00:12:38.335 possibly with help 306 00:12:38.515 --> 00:12:40.664 from American satellites and intelligence. 307 00:12:40.914 --> 00:12:42.434 But sometimes commanders were looking 308 00:12:42.434 --> 00:12:45.015 for these incredibly sophisticated explanations 309 00:12:45.195 --> 00:12:47.664 when the real problem was much more simple. 310 00:12:47.875 --> 00:12:50.875 One of their own officers was secretly texting their 311 00:12:50.875 --> 00:12:53.825 locations and attack plans directly to Ukrainian intelligence. 312 00:12:54.155 --> 00:12:57.895 Russia was spending billions trying to counter modern surveillance technology 313 00:12:58.275 --> 00:12:58.715 while getting. 314 00:12:58.830 --> 00:13:02.229 Compromised by some good old fashioned espionage tradecraft. 315 00:13:02.429 --> 00:13:03.869 Eventually his commander though, 316 00:13:04.099 --> 00:13:07.409 even joked about having a Soviet-style spy in the room 317 00:13:07.619 --> 00:13:09.710 and looked directly at Stupnikov, 318 00:13:09.989 --> 00:13:12.830 which sounds like something out of a spy movie about moles. 319 00:13:12.989 --> 00:13:15.130 But then something nearly ended it all, 320 00:13:15.229 --> 00:13:18.010 and Stupnikov almost died because of his own mistake. 321 00:13:18.309 --> 00:13:21.739 When he was passing a headquarters location to Ukrainian intelligence, 322 00:13:22.030 --> 00:13:25.179 he accidentally sent the coordinates for the basement where he slept, 323 00:13:25.349 --> 00:13:26.510 then a strike hit the building. 324 00:13:26.905 --> 00:13:27.744 Where he was at, 325 00:13:27.755 --> 00:13:29.525 nearly offing himself accidentally, 326 00:13:29.744 --> 00:13:32.344 but at least it might have taken some of the suspicion off 327 00:13:32.344 --> 00:13:35.465 of him because who would be stupid enough to strike themselves. 328 00:13:35.625 --> 00:13:36.224 So by summer, 329 00:13:36.304 --> 00:13:39.405 he fully expected Russian counterintelligence to discover him 330 00:13:39.905 --> 00:13:42.604 or for him to just get killed by Ukraine accidentally. 331 00:13:42.945 --> 00:13:45.705 This was when finally the Ukrainian intelligence said 332 00:13:45.705 --> 00:13:47.505 that they were ready to extract him. 333 00:13:47.705 --> 00:13:50.104 He had done enough for them to warrant extraction, 334 00:13:50.184 --> 00:13:50.565 which 335 00:13:50.705 --> 00:13:53.984 can be an incredibly dangerous mission for Ukraine to undertake. 336 00:13:54.419 --> 00:13:56.530 Get him back safely to their side. 337 00:13:56.780 --> 00:13:58.669 It would expose their own soldiers 338 00:13:59.059 --> 00:14:00.659 trying to save this defector. 339 00:14:00.929 --> 00:14:01.739 On July 6, 340 00:14:01.859 --> 00:14:02.729 2024, 341 00:14:02.849 --> 00:14:05.159 Stupnikov left the Russian positions, 342 00:14:05.299 --> 00:14:07.780 and he headed for Ukraine's 72nd brigade. 343 00:14:07.979 --> 00:14:09.929 But there was one huge problem, 344 00:14:10.179 --> 00:14:11.679 because between them lay 345 00:14:11.940 --> 00:14:14.979 mine battlefield that was littered with razor wire, 346 00:14:15.059 --> 00:14:15.419 mines, 347 00:14:15.460 --> 00:14:15.940 wreckage, 348 00:14:15.979 --> 00:14:17.090 and shell craters. 349 00:14:17.380 --> 00:14:19.760 Both sides watched this no man's land 350 00:14:19.940 --> 00:14:20.859 with their drones, 351 00:14:20.900 --> 00:14:22.099 and both sides had plunged. 352 00:14:22.354 --> 00:14:22.794 of reason 353 00:14:23.195 --> 00:14:26.164 to shoot a Russian soldier wandering through no man's land, 354 00:14:26.294 --> 00:14:28.114 and a man in uniform 355 00:14:28.255 --> 00:14:30.265 has very few ways to explain himself 356 00:14:30.655 --> 00:14:32.075 if he runs into the wrong guard. 357 00:14:32.414 --> 00:14:34.854 His contacts in Ukraine shared reconnaissance footage 358 00:14:34.854 --> 00:14:37.075 of the route that they believed was safe 359 00:14:37.335 --> 00:14:38.294 through the no man's land, 360 00:14:38.375 --> 00:14:40.114 and they gave him a special password 361 00:14:40.575 --> 00:14:44.325 that would allow him to safely communicate with the Ukrainian soldiers. 362 00:14:44.534 --> 00:14:47.844 According to the investigation and video footage of his crossing, 363 00:14:48.135 --> 00:14:49.895 he left with his phone. 364 00:14:50.010 --> 00:14:50.989 And military radio. 365 00:14:51.250 --> 00:14:52.479 Near the village edge, 366 00:14:52.690 --> 00:14:53.690 he was stopped though, 367 00:14:53.770 --> 00:14:55.330 a Russian guard challenged him. 368 00:14:55.489 --> 00:14:58.200 Stupnikov said that he was inspecting surveillance cameras, 369 00:14:58.270 --> 00:14:58.989 nothing to see here, 370 00:14:59.210 --> 00:15:03.330 which was a believable excuse for someone in his role as a communications officer. 371 00:15:03.450 --> 00:15:07.000 The guard then warned him against going too far toward the Ukrainians. 372 00:15:07.250 --> 00:15:08.440 He promised that he wouldn't. 373 00:15:08.679 --> 00:15:09.409 Above him though, 374 00:15:09.489 --> 00:15:11.950 a Ukrainian drone followed his heat signature 375 00:15:12.169 --> 00:15:14.270 while operators watched on a thermal screen. 376 00:15:14.650 --> 00:15:16.630 He had reviewed footage of the route in advance, 377 00:15:16.849 --> 00:15:17.400 but knowing where. 378 00:15:17.804 --> 00:15:19.125 A mine might be, 379 00:15:19.604 --> 00:15:22.724 spotting one in the darkness is a very difficult thing to do. 380 00:15:22.924 --> 00:15:24.484 He moved past the shell craters, 381 00:15:24.525 --> 00:15:25.515 the twisted metal, 382 00:15:25.794 --> 00:15:28.554 all while trying to avoid anything that might blow him up. 383 00:15:28.804 --> 00:15:30.844 He was too far now to turn back. 384 00:15:30.974 --> 00:15:33.385 The only way through was through the other side. 385 00:15:33.924 --> 00:15:35.965 For all the planning and technology involved, 386 00:15:36.005 --> 00:15:38.585 the final part of this intelligence operation 387 00:15:38.885 --> 00:15:41.994 still came down to just him putting 1 ft in front of the other. 388 00:15:42.205 --> 00:15:43.594 After about 40 minutes, 389 00:15:43.804 --> 00:15:45.424 he heard ducks near a pond. 390 00:15:45.750 --> 00:15:48.789 And he knew that he was near the agreed position for his pickup. 391 00:15:48.960 --> 00:15:51.570 Ukrainian soldiers then emerged out of the woods 392 00:15:51.570 --> 00:15:53.500 with their rifles trained right on him. 393 00:15:53.679 --> 00:15:54.549 From their perspective, 394 00:15:54.599 --> 00:15:55.940 a Russian officer had just 395 00:15:56.210 --> 00:15:57.520 approached their trench at night. 396 00:15:57.719 --> 00:15:58.820 One wrong movement 397 00:15:58.960 --> 00:15:59.840 could kill him. 398 00:16:00.190 --> 00:16:03.330 Stupnikov then said the password peanut shop, 399 00:16:03.679 --> 00:16:04.820 the magic words. 400 00:16:05.119 --> 00:16:06.919 The Ukrainian soldiers then searched him, 401 00:16:06.989 --> 00:16:07.950 blindfolded him, 402 00:16:08.159 --> 00:16:09.280 and took him into custody. 403 00:16:09.440 --> 00:16:10.590 After months of this, 404 00:16:10.799 --> 00:16:13.299 he'd finally made it to the other side safely. 405 00:16:13.840 --> 00:16:14.630 The next morning, 406 00:16:14.880 --> 00:16:16.239 he called his mother in Russia, 407 00:16:16.280 --> 00:16:18.469 who didn't even know that he'd attempted the crossing, 408 00:16:18.760 --> 00:16:21.219 but he used the phrase that they had pre-agreed on, 409 00:16:21.469 --> 00:16:23.799 which would mean that he had escaped safely. 410 00:16:24.080 --> 00:16:24.799 She understood, 411 00:16:24.909 --> 00:16:26.510 and in February 2025, 412 00:16:26.599 --> 00:16:29.219 his mother and younger sister also left Russia 413 00:16:29.400 --> 00:16:30.719 and joined him in Ukraine, 414 00:16:30.840 --> 00:16:33.260 but his wife stayed in Russia and rejected 415 00:16:33.440 --> 00:16:34.640 his request to join him. 416 00:16:34.799 --> 00:16:36.539 Stupnikov accepted an offer 417 00:16:36.880 --> 00:16:39.030 to work with the Russian volunteer Corps, 418 00:16:39.239 --> 00:16:42.000 which sent him back into combat against his former. 419 00:16:42.497 --> 00:16:43.937 because the fight wasn't over. 420 00:16:44.017 --> 00:16:45.577 It was just starting at this point. 421 00:16:45.856 --> 00:16:47.396 The network of defectors 422 00:16:47.536 --> 00:16:48.836 that Ukraine was building 423 00:16:48.966 --> 00:16:50.877 had reached higher and higher positions. 424 00:16:50.976 --> 00:16:54.416 They were infiltrating closer and closer to Putin's inner circle, 425 00:16:54.697 --> 00:16:58.356 and this defection was just the beginning of Ukraine's larger plan 426 00:16:58.776 --> 00:16:59.586 to infiltrate 427 00:16:59.937 --> 00:17:01.827 and hit Putin's army from within. 428 00:17:02.057 --> 00:17:03.166 Because at the same time, 429 00:17:03.377 --> 00:17:07.496 the Russian missile corvette Serpakov caught fire in Kaliningrad. 430 00:17:07.766 --> 00:17:10.296 This is Moscow's Baltic enclave between Poland. 431 00:17:10.432 --> 00:17:11.311 And Lithuania. 432 00:17:11.483 --> 00:17:14.583 But who could sabotage a Russian warship so far from Ukraine? 433 00:17:14.742 --> 00:17:14.863 Well, 434 00:17:14.953 --> 00:17:16.103 the culprit was Goga, 435 00:17:16.182 --> 00:17:20.742 an eleven-year Russian naval veteran who opposed the invasion of Ukraine. 436 00:17:20.942 --> 00:17:22.692 He had openly criticized the war, 437 00:17:22.922 --> 00:17:23.392 and 438 00:17:23.593 --> 00:17:24.321 in return, 439 00:17:24.473 --> 00:17:25.932 he received a warning for it. 440 00:17:26.152 --> 00:17:27.593 He then he tried to leave, 441 00:17:27.672 --> 00:17:30.152 but his Russian commanders refused to let him leave. 442 00:17:30.473 --> 00:17:32.353 Surely nothing could go wrong with that 443 00:17:32.512 --> 00:17:33.623 and come back to haunt them, 444 00:17:33.682 --> 00:17:34.062 right? 445 00:17:34.233 --> 00:17:37.192 So Goga secretly contacted the Freedom of Russia Legion, 446 00:17:37.483 --> 00:17:38.473 which is a Ukrainian. 447 00:17:38.850 --> 00:17:41.281 Unit of Russian defectors who opposed Putin. 448 00:17:41.640 --> 00:17:43.840 Working with Ukrainian military intelligence, 449 00:17:44.090 --> 00:17:46.510 he helped plan an operation against his own ship. 450 00:17:46.730 --> 00:17:47.770 In April 2024, 451 00:17:47.970 --> 00:17:50.211 Goga carried out Operation Rybalka, 452 00:17:50.411 --> 00:17:51.831 and he set fire to equipment 453 00:17:52.130 --> 00:17:53.250 aboard the ship, 454 00:17:53.360 --> 00:17:56.281 damaging the ship's communications and automated control systems. 455 00:17:56.451 --> 00:17:58.250 He also managed to steal classified 456 00:17:58.250 --> 00:18:01.370 military documents before escaping Russian territory. 457 00:18:01.610 --> 00:18:05.350 Probably not what he imagined when he first joined and wanted to make an impact on 458 00:18:05.490 --> 00:18:06.240 the Russian navy. 459 00:18:06.291 --> 00:18:06.760 It was a different. 460 00:18:07.187 --> 00:18:08.598 Kind of impact that he ended up making. 461 00:18:08.907 --> 00:18:11.328 Ukraine later released footage of the damaged ship, 462 00:18:11.468 --> 00:18:13.828 and claimed the sabotage had disabled all these 463 00:18:13.828 --> 00:18:16.368 different critical systems for an extended period. 464 00:18:16.748 --> 00:18:17.728 The Russian navy 465 00:18:17.907 --> 00:18:20.368 now had to assess which systems could be trusted 466 00:18:20.508 --> 00:18:23.447 and how much classified information Goga had taken with him 467 00:18:23.937 --> 00:18:25.248 across the Lithuanian border. 468 00:18:25.387 --> 00:18:28.307 The investigation itself consumed all this time that the 469 00:18:28.307 --> 00:18:30.687 crew was supposed to spend operating the ship. 470 00:18:30.868 --> 00:18:33.907 He then made his escape over land through Lithuania, 471 00:18:34.147 --> 00:18:35.187 where he joined the Russians. 472 00:18:35.364 --> 00:18:35.885 Legion, 473 00:18:36.125 --> 00:18:39.974 and he was later asked in an interview if he felt guilty about Russians dying, 474 00:18:40.125 --> 00:18:43.084 and he said he felt relief that fewer Ukrainians would die. 475 00:18:43.324 --> 00:18:45.135 And Goga was far from alone. 476 00:18:45.244 --> 00:18:48.425 Thousands of Russian soldiers also wanted out of the war. 477 00:18:48.635 --> 00:18:49.175 And so, 478 00:18:49.285 --> 00:18:51.744 I want to know just how large of a problem 479 00:18:51.925 --> 00:18:54.135 these defectors are for the Russian military, 480 00:18:54.484 --> 00:18:57.665 because Russian soldiers use the slang cargo 500 481 00:18:57.885 --> 00:19:00.185 for men who are absent without permission or 482 00:19:00.324 --> 00:19:00.844 AWOL. 483 00:19:01.045 --> 00:19:02.364 In May 2025, 484 00:19:02.484 --> 00:19:03.525 I Stories examined. 485 00:19:03.651 --> 00:19:07.182 leaked records listing over 49,000 unique people 486 00:19:07.182 --> 00:19:09.302 who were flagged as deserters or AWOL. 487 00:19:10.631 --> 00:19:12.031 The data did likely contain some errors, 488 00:19:12.182 --> 00:19:15.182 including men that were later identified as dead or captured, 489 00:19:15.381 --> 00:19:16.531 but it gives us an idea, 490 00:19:16.541 --> 00:19:18.102 and Frontelligence Insight 491 00:19:18.491 --> 00:19:22.761 reviewed further Russian records and found rates of serious unauthorized absence 492 00:19:23.021 --> 00:19:24.202 and roughly doubled 493 00:19:24.501 --> 00:19:27.161 from 2025 compared to the previous year. 494 00:19:27.381 --> 00:19:31.802 Researchers projected as many as 70,000 cases that year if the pace held. 495 00:19:32.060 --> 00:19:35.010 It represents a pretty significant strain on Russia's army, 496 00:19:35.260 --> 00:19:36.959 needing experienced personnel. 497 00:19:37.180 --> 00:19:39.640 It's an issue that both armies really deal with. 498 00:19:39.859 --> 00:19:40.719 According to reports, 499 00:19:40.800 --> 00:19:41.609 I can tell you 500 00:19:41.859 --> 00:19:42.979 who we're looking at here. 501 00:19:43.060 --> 00:19:46.079 The profile of the typical Russian deserter or defector 502 00:19:46.300 --> 00:19:48.569 was a contract soldier in his late 30s. 503 00:19:48.859 --> 00:19:50.020 Some opposed the war already, 504 00:19:50.160 --> 00:19:52.160 others signed up for money and then just found 505 00:19:52.160 --> 00:19:54.079 out that the trenches weren't what they wanted. 506 00:19:54.339 --> 00:19:57.579 Russian military police have to chase down these defectors 507 00:19:57.579 --> 00:19:59.900 and deserters and return them to their units. 508 00:20:00.219 --> 00:20:01.459 Silver was a drone. 509 00:20:01.621 --> 00:20:05.171 operator who saw commanders beating his own Russian soldiers 510 00:20:05.171 --> 00:20:08.751 and accused his unit of corrupt and extrajudicial killings. 511 00:20:08.952 --> 00:20:11.232 He contacted Ukrainian intelligence because of this 512 00:20:11.232 --> 00:20:13.671 and started passing along military information. 513 00:20:13.952 --> 00:20:14.761 For several months, 514 00:20:15.671 --> 00:20:17.511 Silver supplied the Ukrainians with information 515 00:20:17.511 --> 00:20:19.982 about Russian positions and military operations. 516 00:20:20.232 --> 00:20:21.261 But in 2024, 517 00:20:21.312 --> 00:20:23.582 he took his betrayal a step further. 518 00:20:23.832 --> 00:20:25.432 During an operation in Donetsk, 519 00:20:25.712 --> 00:20:28.232 Silver threw a grenade through a ventilation shaft in 520 00:20:28.232 --> 00:20:30.932 a basement where his Russian commanders were sleeping. 521 00:20:31.124 --> 00:20:33.274 According to Ukrainian military intelligence, 522 00:20:33.484 --> 00:20:36.004 the commander was wounded before Silver managed to 523 00:20:36.004 --> 00:20:38.563 escape and joined the Freedom of Russia Legion. 524 00:20:38.764 --> 00:20:40.843 A dramatic way to hand in your resignation, 525 00:20:40.923 --> 00:20:41.223 but 526 00:20:41.364 --> 00:20:44.423 I doubt a two-week notice would have really worked at that point either. 527 00:20:44.673 --> 00:20:46.524 And the Ukrainians have developed an entire 528 00:20:46.524 --> 00:20:49.583 recruitment pipeline to run their defection campaign. 529 00:20:49.994 --> 00:20:52.183 It's called I Want to Live program, 530 00:20:52.364 --> 00:20:55.354 and it's designed to encourage Russian soldiers to surrender. 531 00:20:55.484 --> 00:20:58.764 The program allows Russians to secretly contact Ukrainian 532 00:20:58.764 --> 00:21:00.524 representatives and arrange a way out of the. 533 00:21:00.725 --> 00:21:00.936 War. 534 00:21:01.336 --> 00:21:02.735 Their information can be passed to the 535 00:21:02.735 --> 00:21:05.676 HUR operatives who coordinate their extraction. 536 00:21:05.776 --> 00:21:08.446 It uses social media like Telegram to operate. 537 00:21:08.735 --> 00:21:11.076 Soldiers can contact the program anonymously 538 00:21:11.255 --> 00:21:12.375 to arrange their surrender. 539 00:21:12.536 --> 00:21:15.855 The way it works is Ukrainian representatives are essentially using the 540 00:21:15.855 --> 00:21:19.416 same online recruitment techniques that you'd find in digital marketing, 541 00:21:19.456 --> 00:21:19.836 except 542 00:21:20.176 --> 00:21:21.556 the target audience is 543 00:21:21.816 --> 00:21:24.015 Russian soldiers who want to leave the war. 544 00:21:24.176 --> 00:21:25.666 A Russian soldier named Eric, 545 00:21:25.895 --> 00:21:28.816 who was mobilized for the Russian army in 2023 546 00:21:28.975 --> 00:21:30.056 and assigned an assault. 547 00:21:30.187 --> 00:21:31.567 Formation near Luhansk, 548 00:21:31.708 --> 00:21:35.748 opposed the invasion and secretly collected information about Russian positions 549 00:21:35.907 --> 00:21:38.817 while trying to find a way to escape across no man's land. 550 00:21:39.108 --> 00:21:39.498 Eventually, 551 00:21:39.508 --> 00:21:41.927 he contacted Ukraine's surrender program, 552 00:21:42.108 --> 00:21:43.988 and the way it goes is just crazy. 553 00:21:44.067 --> 00:21:45.098 I was shocked by this. 554 00:21:45.267 --> 00:21:48.618 But when his Ukrainian handlers learned where Eric was located, 555 00:21:48.907 --> 00:21:50.708 they realized that he was in a position to 556 00:21:50.708 --> 00:21:52.777 help with a very different problem they had, 557 00:21:53.108 --> 00:21:55.628 because there were two wounded Ukrainian soldiers who 558 00:21:55.628 --> 00:21:57.937 were stranded behind Russian lines near him. 559 00:21:58.187 --> 00:21:59.628 If Eric could reach those Ukraine. 560 00:21:59.959 --> 00:22:01.729 soldiers and help them escape, 561 00:22:01.959 --> 00:22:02.979 all three men 562 00:22:03.160 --> 00:22:06.880 might have a chance of crossing into Ukrainian territory safely together. 563 00:22:07.239 --> 00:22:08.719 3 birds with one stone. 564 00:22:08.890 --> 00:22:12.119 He managed to obtain Russian military uniforms for them all, 565 00:22:12.439 --> 00:22:13.119 body armor, 566 00:22:13.199 --> 00:22:17.359 and documents to disguise the wounded Ukrainians as Russian soldiers. 567 00:22:17.640 --> 00:22:18.780 He then stole a vehicle, 568 00:22:19.160 --> 00:22:21.579 used it to pick up the two Ukrainian men 569 00:22:22.050 --> 00:22:25.229 before attempting to make his way back toward Ukrainian territory. 570 00:22:25.479 --> 00:22:29.130 That disguise gave the group a chance to look like just another Russian military. 571 00:22:29.251 --> 00:22:30.342 Vehicle at a glance, 572 00:22:30.572 --> 00:22:33.332 but if anyone inspected them too closely or looked at their documents, 573 00:22:33.411 --> 00:22:36.192 the entire rescue would unravel in just seconds. 574 00:22:36.452 --> 00:22:38.962 And even if they managed to avoid Russian checkpoints, 575 00:22:39.131 --> 00:22:42.031 they still had to cross a heavily mined battlefield 576 00:22:42.411 --> 00:22:44.812 where the Ukrainians might mistake them for the enemy. 577 00:22:44.972 --> 00:22:48.131 When Ukrainian soldiers emerged from their trenches to receive them, 578 00:22:48.411 --> 00:22:50.641 Eric mistakenly thought that they were Russians, 579 00:22:50.891 --> 00:22:54.511 so he accidentally told his own rescuers to go to hell and walked away. 580 00:22:54.771 --> 00:22:56.751 He eventually found the Ukrainian soldiers again, 581 00:22:57.011 --> 00:22:58.661 and was taken into their positions. 582 00:22:58.904 --> 00:23:01.244 Where they gave him something to eat and he was safe, 583 00:23:01.274 --> 00:23:03.384 and one of their first questions that he asked 584 00:23:03.583 --> 00:23:06.124 was whether the Freedom of Russia Legion was 585 00:23:06.264 --> 00:23:06.973 even real. 586 00:23:07.223 --> 00:23:09.624 So the guy had risked his life rescuing two Ukrainians, 587 00:23:09.774 --> 00:23:10.764 crossing a minefield 588 00:23:10.904 --> 00:23:13.923 to join an organization that he wasn't even entirely sure was real. 589 00:23:14.223 --> 00:23:16.963 The most Russian version of a job interview I think I've ever heard. 590 00:23:17.413 --> 00:23:17.823 After that, 591 00:23:17.943 --> 00:23:21.774 Eric eventually joined the Legion and became a reconnaissance drone commander. 592 00:23:21.984 --> 00:23:24.063 One of the most valuable defections in the unit 593 00:23:24.303 --> 00:23:26.923 hitting Ukraine hardest right now is Rubicon, 594 00:23:27.014 --> 00:23:28.183 and a man named Simonov. 595 00:23:28.375 --> 00:23:31.456 drone operator from the Russian elite Rubicon drone unit 596 00:23:31.715 --> 00:23:33.586 said that he was becoming disillusioned after 597 00:23:33.586 --> 00:23:35.706 he saw abuses inside the Russian military, 598 00:23:36.026 --> 00:23:37.186 including attacks on civilians. 599 00:23:37.276 --> 00:23:39.696 So he secretly contacted Ukrainian intelligence 600 00:23:39.836 --> 00:23:41.796 and eventually escaped across the front line. 601 00:23:42.076 --> 00:23:42.865 Now Ukraine, 602 00:23:43.115 --> 00:23:47.115 they had their chance to learn from a very experienced fleeing man. 603 00:23:47.355 --> 00:23:50.586 Here we can see the larger ambition behind these stories. 604 00:23:50.755 --> 00:23:52.975 Some Russian formations fighting for Ukraine 605 00:23:53.235 --> 00:23:55.556 openly want to bring their armed struggle 606 00:23:55.556 --> 00:23:57.715 into Russia and challenge Putin's government. 607 00:23:58.069 --> 00:24:01.469 Ukraine's goal is to turn that internal dissatisfaction 608 00:24:01.750 --> 00:24:04.020 into an enduring armed opposition, 609 00:24:04.229 --> 00:24:06.380 but how far can that opposition go? 610 00:24:06.630 --> 00:24:10.069 Every defector appearing publicly in Ukrainian uniform 611 00:24:10.069 --> 00:24:12.949 challenges Moscow's story of national unity. 612 00:24:13.349 --> 00:24:15.520 There's this big propaganda victory for it. 613 00:24:15.829 --> 00:24:16.089 So, 614 00:24:16.189 --> 00:24:18.829 the question is how many soldiers still serving 615 00:24:18.829 --> 00:24:21.859 Russia might privately agree with the Ukrainians. 616 00:24:22.089 --> 00:24:24.579 I don't think this means that the Russian army is collapsing, 617 00:24:24.660 --> 00:24:27.109 but it does mean a small number of insiders 618 00:24:27.310 --> 00:24:31.010 can disrupt military operations and leave commanders wondering 619 00:24:31.270 --> 00:24:32.689 who they can trust. 620 00:24:32.949 --> 00:24:33.829 I'm Chris Cappy, 621 00:24:33.949 --> 00:24:34.979 thank you for watching, 622 00:24:35.109 --> 00:24:36.550 and I'll see you in the next transmission.