WEBVTT

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What you&#x27;re watching right now should be totally impossible.

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It&#x27;s Ukrainian armored vehicles advancing across

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wide open fields in Operation Vivaldi,

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even though military experts told us that drones

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had made large armored breakthroughs a death sentence.

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Despite this,

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Ukrainian troops somehow just pulled it off and pushed Russian forces back,

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rearranging their front line for them right as they were

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closing in on one of Ukraine&#x27;s most important defensive lines.

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So how did Ukraine pull off an attack like this that was supposed to be?

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Obsolete,

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and why are similar breakthroughs suddenly happening in other wars?

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Today I&#x27;m gonna show you that I think the answer

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comes down to 3 new evolutions in maneuver warfare.

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As the Ukrainian armored convoy attacks deep

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into Russian lines in Operation Vivaldi,

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they&#x27;re making a ton of noise.

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You see them firing their heavy machine guns,

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suppressive fire,

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while the infantry attack directly into the occupied villages nearby.

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How is this possible after the element of surprise.

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Maneuver warfare was supposed to be all but lost.

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Well,

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that may be the point.

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A key objective for phase one of Operation Vivaldi

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was misdirecting the enemy and neutralizing the Russian drone forces.

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So the Ukrainians knew that the Russian side

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had deployed their most elite drone unit,

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codename Rubicon,

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to the Lyman area as part of a push against the Donbass fortress belt.

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This is a strategically important region to the war.

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Much of the front line hinges on what happens here.

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A lot is at stake because the town of

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Lyman sits on a critical road guarding the northern approach

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toward two of the major cities in Ukraine&#x27;s Donbass fortress belt.

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Russian forces had spent about two months grinding toward this area,

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trying to build the northern half of a pincer

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around those defenses.

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If that salient kept expanding here for Russia,

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Russia could pressure the last series.

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Of cities

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protecting Ukraine&#x27;s front line in the south.

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Ukraine&#x27;s Operation Vivaldi here needed to return maneuver warfare.

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It needed to find a way to return large scale mechanized

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warfare in a place where experts thought it was long dead.

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They were disrupting one of Russia&#x27;s main approaches toward

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the remaining Ukrainian-held defensive network in the Donetsk,

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and buying those fortress cities,

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something that every defender needs in a war.

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Attrition,

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more time,

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and so Ukraine launched multiple aggressive hit and run style

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assaults like this one in order to convince the Russian forces

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that more Ukrainians were operating in the area

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than there actually was.

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Step one of the modern assault is to first blind them in the deception phase.

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These probing attacks drew out Russia&#x27;s Rubicon drones,

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which in turn exposed their launch sites and resupply locations.

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Probing attacks are nothing new in military

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history when it comes to maneuver warfare,

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but in this one,

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in the way that the Ukrainian forces did it in

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Operation Vivaldi is a common new twist on it.

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They were probing to make Russia&#x27;s entire drone kill chain reveal itself.

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Very considerate of Rubicon really to,

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to go ahead,

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because Ukrainian forces just needed a target list,

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and

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they were happy to populate it.

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Then the hunters became the hunted.

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Be sure to tell them that Cappy.

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The army sent you

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to support the shell.

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While the advancing Ukrainian troops and armored trucks were screened

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by their air defenses and heavy electronic warfare equipment,

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Ukraine&#x27;s own attack drone teams struck at the Rubicon operators themselves,

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using new,

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more advanced drone models like the Hornet.

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They were able to accomplish this.

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With its 150 kilometer range and onboard AI target tracking software,

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the Ukrainian hunting party systematically dismantled.

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Enemy Russian Rubicon units over the course of several weeks.

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So the Russian Rubicon drone units had spent years making itself indispensable.

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Unfortunately for them,

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that also made them

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worth an enormous amount of effort

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to kill.

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And this is where modern warfare,

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maneuver warfare has evolved.

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The Ukrainian tanks can move faster

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than the electronic warfare teams

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and their air defense umbrella

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that is supporting them,

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and that&#x27;s why Ukraine.

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Used close air support

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from the drones

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in order to quickly move up,

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move their protection umbrella up and to save them time

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to moving their slower defensive assets up with them.

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Because

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every kilometer forward,

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every mile forward stretches the network

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that made that breakthrough possible in the first place.

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But this would not have been enough,

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on its own,

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without step two

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of a modern assault,

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which is to isolate them.

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What does that mean?

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Russia was unable to keep supplies flowing

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to their drone teams and their infantry units

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that were getting hammered.

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Thanks to Ukraine&#x27;s mid-range strike campaign going on at the same time.

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And so what we see here is Russia&#x27;s most experienced

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drone operators were in danger of being totally wiped out.

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Russian high command was forced to pull what was left of Rubicon

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out of the Lyman salient,

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with their tails between their legs and their

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bums being dragged across the carpet floor.

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When I visited this part of the front.

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Line in Ukraine.

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I can tell you the geography here is just wide open fields,

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rural farmland,

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just 500 m from tree line to tree line.

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So making any kind of advance or hiding any kind of

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troop movements or build-up here is really an insane feat.

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It&#x27;s rewriting the modern rules of maneuver warfare.

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Again,

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because Ukraine&#x27;s 3rd Army Corps broke all the rules that we thought we knew,

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they managed to pull off not just a surprise attack,

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but an entire months-long

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secret counteroffensive.

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How were they able to do this?

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It was supposed to be impossible.

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Yet since the start of Operation Vivaldi back in May,

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the 3rd Army Corps has seized more than 140 square kilometers near

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linemen and driven Russian casualties up to a staggering 42,000 per month.

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New footage shows Ukraine&#x27;s 66th mechanized brigade.

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Clearing and liberating towns during Operation Vivaldi,

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while troops pushed through the village itself here,

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soldiers from the first mechanized battalion and another motorized

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infantry battalion stormed a forest just in the north,

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clearing Russian positions and expanding the

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defensive buffer around the settlement.

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Once you punch through the line,

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somebody still has to go tree line by tree line

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and make sure the enemy is eliminated and report

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back to their captain that it&#x27;s all clear,

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even liberation.

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come with

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a lot of paperwork.

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After Ukraine sprung the trap on Russian Rubicon forces,

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the 3rd Army Corps achieved local drone superiority,

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and they effectively blinded Russia.

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In modern maneuver warfare,

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military experts are now splitting air superiority,

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like with fighter jets and bombers up top,

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into littoral air superiority,

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that means controlling the air directly above your head,

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where drones are instead of fighter jets.

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Here we see assault.

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Squads bypassing the tiny dispersed Russian infantry

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positions to see settlements in their rear.

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They just roll past them saying,

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see you later,

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bye Felicia,

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essentially,

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and the Ukrainians have their own armored vehicles to support,

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while the Russians on the ground here do not.

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Once you blind the other guy,

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suddenly those same open ground that looked like a death

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trap highway is now a superhighway for your advance.

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Because what they did was they just went around those tiny.

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Russian pockets to just advance past them essentially and to cut them off.

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Because by phase two of Operation Vivaldi,

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Ukraine&#x27;s mid-range strike campaign had

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effectively paralyzed Russian logistics networks.

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Russian units at the front line started going weeks without food,

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ammo,

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or fuel.

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That last part is important because drones and communication gear

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remaining in the linemen sector,

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they need generators,

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and they need the cities in that region

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to have power so that they can charge their batteries.

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And usually once you get close enough to the front,

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everywhere within 10 kilometers of it

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is basically has no power running there.

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As June rolled into August and fuel shortages crippled Russia&#x27;s trucks,

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Russian infantry had to walk as far as 20 kilometers

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to reach the front line in some areas

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under constant Ukrainian drone attack the whole way,

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which would be a big fucking nope

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from me.

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I mean,

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they&#x27;d probably shoot me for saying nope,

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but that,

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that&#x27;s still a nope for me,

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at that mission.

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Meanwhile,

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the Ukrainian.

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infantry could move about freely,

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attacking Russian-held settlements and positions almost at will.

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Each time they liberated a town,

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they encountered the same story time and time again.

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They reported seeing malnourished and poorly motivated Russian troops.

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The 3rd Army Corps,

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Ukraine&#x27;s 3rd Army Corps,

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took more than 250 prisoners during just this phase of the operation,

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because it turns out the hold the line order loses a

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lot of motivational power when you&#x27;re out of ammo and food.

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But with all of this action in one sector,

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how did Ukraine manage to keep the operation a secret this long?

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The way it worked was instead of publicizing

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each victory like the Ukrainian military often would,

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Ukraine coordinated across multiple defense media outlets

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and the pro-Ukrainian open source intelligence community

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to keep things on the down low,

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and this is part of the reason why

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you see media get

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taken over when there&#x27;s martial law,

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so they can control this kind of,

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OPSAC,

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Russia&#x27;s own military culture and command structure also unwittingly

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played a major part in its own misdirection.

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What do I mean by that?

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Because part of Moscow&#x27;s strategy in this war is to keep up

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pressure on Ukraine and to make an eventual victory seem inevitable.

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Key to that strategy for Russia is nonstop headlines of Russian advances.

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Even if it&#x27;s only a handful of kilometers a month.

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So Russian commanders are under immense pressure themselves

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to continually report territorial gains

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back to the Kremlin,

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to the point that many of them would rather

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lie instead of risking punishment or admitting losses.

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And so with their drone coverage near alignment,

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severely degraded by the loss of a Russian Rubicon.

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Units

262
00:11:11.875 --> 00:11:13.466
and their supply shortages,

263
00:11:13.716 --> 00:11:17.625
Russian generals&#x27; only source of information about Ukrainian movements

264
00:11:17.835 --> 00:11:20.705
came from their own unreliable reports.

265
00:11:20.995 --> 00:11:24.015
This created this kind of nightmare feedback loop,

266
00:11:24.156 --> 00:11:28.265
where the frontline commanders lie or stay quiet about losses,

267
00:11:28.466 --> 00:11:33.796
which means forces behind them don&#x27;t get warned about impeding attacks on time.

268
00:11:34.059 --> 00:11:38.159
And up the chain of command it goes as entire units under constant attack

269
00:11:39.909 --> 00:11:42.080
don&#x27;t get prioritized for the few remaining supplies there,

270
00:11:42.380 --> 00:11:45.250
because the higher-ups think everything is going peachy,

271
00:11:45.489 --> 00:11:49.119
which is a really great way to run an army if your main objective

272
00:11:49.330 --> 00:11:53.039
is to make sure everyone above you remains in a constant state of surprise.

273
00:11:53.340 --> 00:11:56.179
So the information war is just as important as ever.

274
00:11:56.340 --> 00:11:58.479
The front lines of information on the internet

275
00:11:58.659 --> 00:12:00.159
is cyberwarfare.

276
00:12:00.299 --> 00:12:02.570
It&#x27;s an important element to advancing,

277
00:12:02.859 --> 00:12:03.859
to maneuver warfare.

278
00:12:04.283 --> 00:12:05.992
In this drone-infested world.

279
00:12:06.533 --> 00:12:09.913
Then phase 3 of Ukraine&#x27;s operational offensive

280
00:12:09.913 --> 00:12:12.273
rolls along in August and September.

281
00:12:12.453 --> 00:12:15.963
This is when the Ukrainian side exploited their enemy&#x27;s vulnerability.

282
00:12:16.252 --> 00:12:18.713
The 3rd Army Corps made a fake attack

283
00:12:18.932 --> 00:12:21.112
against Russia&#x27;s southern perimeter in the region.

284
00:12:21.533 --> 00:12:25.763
Then they unleashed the main attack against the exposed northern flank.

285
00:12:25.932 --> 00:12:29.793
Instead of trying to keep such large troop movements entirely secret,

286
00:12:30.213 --> 00:12:33.692
the 3rd Army Corps stood up a task force whose entire mission.

287
00:12:33.806 --> 00:12:35.505
was to paint false information

288
00:12:35.926 --> 00:12:38.625
about the faint in the public information space.

289
00:12:38.846 --> 00:12:39.786
They were essentially

290
00:12:39.945 --> 00:12:41.356
hiding in plain sight.

291
00:12:41.565 --> 00:12:42.986
They were using the weakness

292
00:12:43.286 --> 00:12:44.825
of everything being visible

293
00:12:44.976 --> 00:12:45.825
as a strength.

294
00:12:46.116 --> 00:12:48.875
Third Army Corps commanding officer Andre

295
00:12:49.166 --> 00:12:52.685
Beletsky described how the plan worked even better than he&#x27;d hoped,

296
00:12:52.846 --> 00:12:53.075
saying,

297
00:12:53.125 --> 00:12:53.486
quote,

298
00:12:53.726 --> 00:12:57.406
the enemy was convinced the main axis of attack was to the south.

299
00:12:57.606 --> 00:13:01.885
This forced it to senselessly burn through its reserves and counterattacks,

300
00:13:01.926 --> 00:13:03.565
specifically along that axis.

301
00:13:03.979 --> 00:13:05.909
The Russians slept through the real strike,

302
00:13:06.150 --> 00:13:08.049
which was focused on capturing Nov.

303
00:13:08.619 --> 00:13:08.830
Sir,

304
00:13:08.909 --> 00:13:11.630
that is an absolutely outrageous amount of mileage

305
00:13:11.630 --> 00:13:13.469
to get out of one deception campaign,

306
00:13:13.500 --> 00:13:14.270
and I love it.

307
00:13:14.590 --> 00:13:18.030
Ukraine&#x27;s signal intelligence staff reports that the Russian radio

308
00:13:18.030 --> 00:13:20.820
network was in absolute panic by this point.

309
00:13:21.070 --> 00:13:24.390
False reports and contradicting orders clogged the airwaves.

310
00:13:24.510 --> 00:13:25.650
Situational awareness

311
00:13:25.989 --> 00:13:27.309
had diminished to the point.

312
00:13:27.726 --> 00:13:30.627
Where squads had zero warning of an incoming attack

313
00:13:30.927 --> 00:13:32.956
until it was directly in their line of sight.

314
00:13:33.206 --> 00:13:37.526
That&#x27;s when Ukraine rolled out another secret weapon in this offensive maneuver,

315
00:13:37.767 --> 00:13:38.726
their heavy armor.

316
00:13:38.956 --> 00:13:40.057
In the Donetsk sector,

317
00:13:40.156 --> 00:13:44.127
a Ukrainian special operations unit eliminated Russian soldiers and

318
00:13:44.127 --> 00:13:47.606
captured others in close combat and urban warfare.

319
00:13:47.887 --> 00:13:50.807
Soldiers questioned the Russian prisoners and analyzed.

320
00:13:50.903 --> 00:13:53.823
Data that they pulled from captured storage devices.

321
00:13:53.984 --> 00:13:56.283
Instead of sending another Ukrainian assault team

322
00:13:56.283 --> 00:13:58.333
in to find those additional Russians,

323
00:13:58.383 --> 00:14:01.494
the Ukrainians passed the coordinates up the chain of command,

324
00:14:01.734 --> 00:14:04.614
and they finished the job with a precision artillery strike.

325
00:14:04.903 --> 00:14:08.963
That is modern combined arms warfare in a microcosm right there,

326
00:14:09.143 --> 00:14:10.283
because you have the infantry

327
00:14:10.533 --> 00:14:11.723
finds that intelligence,

328
00:14:11.823 --> 00:14:14.004
and then the intelligence turns it into a target,

329
00:14:14.184 --> 00:14:15.161
and the Artillery

330
00:14:15.320 --> 00:14:19.031
just handles that customer complaint from a much safer distance.

331
00:14:19.320 --> 00:14:20.281
The larger lesson here,

332
00:14:20.320 --> 00:14:20.710
I think,

333
00:14:20.880 --> 00:14:22.510
is that under constant surveillance,

334
00:14:22.520 --> 00:14:25.520
a successful offensive just depends more and more

335
00:14:25.520 --> 00:14:28.190
on shortening the time between all those steps.

336
00:14:28.440 --> 00:14:31.060
But we&#x27;ve yet to see the finale of how

337
00:14:31.281 --> 00:14:34.231
that evolution of maneuver warfare works in the modern age,

338
00:14:34.241 --> 00:14:34.830
and for that,

339
00:14:34.921 --> 00:14:37.760
we need to look at Ukraine&#x27;s code 9.2.

340
00:14:38.349 --> 00:14:41.979
Ukraine in this astounding footage from code 9.2,

341
00:14:42.210 --> 00:14:47.020
an experimental combat unit within the 475th separate assault regiment,

342
00:14:47.309 --> 00:14:49.900
we see the return of the infamous turtle tanks,

343
00:14:49.950 --> 00:14:52.030
but now by the Ukrainians using them.

344
00:14:52.409 --> 00:14:53.169
So ugly,

345
00:14:53.539 --> 00:14:54.609
can&#x27;t help but love that.

346
00:14:54.820 --> 00:14:57.960
We still don&#x27;t know exactly where this assault took place.

347
00:14:58.260 --> 00:15:00.169
We even reached out to the unit directly,

348
00:15:00.460 --> 00:15:02.659
but they were able to neither confirm nor

349
00:15:02.659 --> 00:15:05.119
deny that this was part of Operation Vivaldi.

350
00:15:05.299 --> 00:15:06.570
We suspect it was,

351
00:15:06.859 --> 00:15:07.520
but either way,

352
00:15:07.539 --> 00:15:10.260
it shows chef&#x27;s kiss maneuver warfare,

353
00:15:10.580 --> 00:15:11.820
especially in the modern age.

354
00:15:11.940 --> 00:15:14.169
It&#x27;s just the epitome of its evolution right now.

355
00:15:14.419 --> 00:15:18.390
The timing and tempo of the attack does line up with Operation Vivaldi.

356
00:15:18.619 --> 00:15:20.840
Here we see the reinforced tank barrel.

357
00:15:21.270 --> 00:15:24.591
Mines and shrug off multiple FPV attack drones

358
00:15:24.861 --> 00:15:27.210
on its way to attack a Russian stronghold.

359
00:15:27.390 --> 00:15:29.171
The Russian defensive philosophy here

360
00:15:29.611 --> 00:15:30.270
appears to be,

361
00:15:30.401 --> 00:15:30.741
uh,

362
00:15:30.911 --> 00:15:32.950
eventually the FPV operator has to get tired,

363
00:15:33.031 --> 00:15:33.281
right?

364
00:15:33.750 --> 00:15:35.411
The Ukrainian tanks are escorted,

365
00:15:35.760 --> 00:15:36.911
this is the big highlight here,

366
00:15:36.991 --> 00:15:39.301
by vampire heavy bomber drones,

367
00:15:39.580 --> 00:15:43.531
which help make up for the turrets being locked in a forward facing position.

368
00:15:43.741 --> 00:15:46.431
Gives a new definition to the meaning of close air support,

369
00:15:46.741 --> 00:15:47.111
just close,

370
00:15:47.190 --> 00:15:47.861
close air support,

371
00:15:48.031 --> 00:15:49.551
so littoral air support.

372
00:15:49.882 --> 00:15:51.002
I think here you guys.

373
00:15:51.202 --> 00:15:52.682
When I went on a mission in Ukraine with

374
00:15:52.682 --> 00:15:55.382
one of these heavy bomber vampire drone teams,

375
00:15:55.442 --> 00:15:57.421
it must be very difficult for them

376
00:15:57.601 --> 00:15:59.521
to run this kind of offensive operation.

377
00:15:59.642 --> 00:16:01.771
Usually they&#x27;re used in defensive positions

378
00:16:02.081 --> 00:16:05.312
because it requires a clear line of communication with those tanks,

379
00:16:05.521 --> 00:16:08.021
and the team controlling the vampire bomber drones

380
00:16:08.122 --> 00:16:09.021
are in risk,

381
00:16:09.132 --> 00:16:12.192
because they need to be right there near the front line somewhere,

382
00:16:12.411 --> 00:16:14.661
hiding in a basement to have range

383
00:16:14.841 --> 00:16:16.072
to advance with them.

384
00:16:16.281 --> 00:16:18.242
The tanks still have plenty of firepower though.

385
00:16:18.612 --> 00:16:21.013
They&#x27;re devastating the Russian enemy fortifications

386
00:16:21.013 --> 00:16:23.692
with their 125 millimeter main guns

387
00:16:23.853 --> 00:16:26.002
before scooting back toward friendly lines.

388
00:16:26.252 --> 00:16:27.372
Without proper warning,

389
00:16:27.473 --> 00:16:28.913
the Russians had no idea

390
00:16:29.372 --> 00:16:30.312
that they were coming.

391
00:16:30.572 --> 00:16:33.192
Only managed to throw a couple of small drones at them

392
00:16:33.492 --> 00:16:35.122
in the last kilometer or so,

393
00:16:35.533 --> 00:16:38.393
instead of intercepting them miles from the target area.

394
00:16:38.812 --> 00:16:42.252
So we see that successful offensive actions use the

395
00:16:42.252 --> 00:16:44.992
very thing that was preventing them in the past.

396
00:16:45.413 --> 00:16:46.932
They rely on drones to screen.

397
00:16:47.143 --> 00:16:47.934
The assault.

398
00:16:48.213 --> 00:16:50.323
It&#x27;s a double-edged sword in that way.

399
00:16:50.544 --> 00:16:54.013
These drones act as a screening element for those tanks advancing,

400
00:16:54.304 --> 00:16:57.294
which is wild to see because it&#x27;s right off of a,

401
00:16:57.463 --> 00:16:58.684
a new field manual

402
00:16:58.984 --> 00:17:00.833
that has barely had time to be printed,

403
00:17:00.984 --> 00:17:04.583
about how to integrate drones with mechanized maneuver warfare.

404
00:17:04.864 --> 00:17:08.203
Then the Ukrainians came up with another insane idea

405
00:17:08.384 --> 00:17:09.534
to break the stalemate,

406
00:17:09.673 --> 00:17:11.483
and this might be the craziest part

407
00:17:11.864 --> 00:17:13.144
of the entire episode.

408
00:17:13.423 --> 00:17:15.624
They rebuilt old Soviet-era BT.

409
00:17:15.755 --> 00:17:19.104
Our transports as remote-controlled demolition charges,

410
00:17:19.314 --> 00:17:20.614
which is pretty insane.

411
00:17:20.755 --> 00:17:22.775
They packed the vehicles full of explosives,

412
00:17:22.993 --> 00:17:26.094
and then they remotely drove these lightly armored vehicles

413
00:17:26.395 --> 00:17:26.775
that

414
00:17:26.993 --> 00:17:31.334
only had to mechanically survive just long enough to reach their target

415
00:17:31.515 --> 00:17:34.055
and the fortification before going kaboom.

416
00:17:34.354 --> 00:17:35.675
Soviet-style VBED.

417
00:17:35.864 --> 00:17:36.064
Again,

418
00:17:36.155 --> 00:17:37.755
none of this would have been possible even a

419
00:17:37.755 --> 00:17:41.334
few months ago when the Rubicon Russian drone units

420
00:17:41.555 --> 00:17:44.324
could destroy these converted BTRs and VBIT.

421
00:17:44.965 --> 00:17:46.406
Far outside the danger zone.

422
00:17:46.566 --> 00:17:46.906
So,

423
00:17:46.965 --> 00:17:49.855
it&#x27;s all about setting the conditions and shaping

424
00:17:49.855 --> 00:17:52.355
operations for these kind of tactics to work.

425
00:17:52.526 --> 00:17:55.946
So what did Ukrainian forces do in phase three?

426
00:17:56.235 --> 00:17:59.076
It&#x27;s when the Ukrainian troops really pulled out

427
00:17:59.076 --> 00:18:02.906
all the stops with yet another innovative weapons system

428
00:18:03.326 --> 00:18:05.245
that you have to see to believe.

429
00:18:05.515 --> 00:18:07.076
Your eyes don&#x27;t deceive you.

430
00:18:07.166 --> 00:18:11.196
This is the world&#x27;s first combat use of robot paratroopers,

431
00:18:11.326 --> 00:18:12.936
a special drone warfare unit.

432
00:18:13.136 --> 00:18:16.256
Named NC-13 spent over a year designing

433
00:18:16.256 --> 00:18:19.437
these Griffin UGVs or unmanned ground vehicles

434
00:18:19.656 --> 00:18:23.276
that are light enough to be carried by heavy vampire bomber drones,

435
00:18:23.536 --> 00:18:27.967
and then they&#x27;re flown in and inserted up to 10 kilometers behind enemy lines,

436
00:18:28.256 --> 00:18:30.016
and the Griffins can be kitted out

437
00:18:30.016 --> 00:18:33.156
for a variety of missions from kamikaze explosives

438
00:18:33.656 --> 00:18:37.707
to heavy weapons platforms and even minesweepers to clear the path.

439
00:18:38.097 --> 00:18:40.477
The Swiss Army knife of Skynet.

440
00:18:40.817 --> 00:18:43.468
The Russians had no The idea that these killer Terminator

441
00:18:43.468 --> 00:18:46.848
robots were creeping around behind them in the back line.

442
00:18:47.147 --> 00:18:49.637
Many unsuspecting Russian soldiers even walked

443
00:18:49.637 --> 00:18:52.748
up to investigate the quirky looking robots

444
00:18:52.748 --> 00:18:57.108
and made the operator&#x27;s job much easier cause then it gets kaboomed.

445
00:18:57.427 --> 00:19:00.147
The airdropped UGVs proved so effective that

446
00:19:00.147 --> 00:19:02.897
they made Russia&#x27;s coordination problem even worse.

447
00:19:03.947 --> 00:19:07.848
Secure positions suddenly started taking machine gun fire from the rear.

448
00:19:07.958 --> 00:19:10.348
Infantry seemed to strike out of no.

449
00:19:10.588 --> 00:19:12.739
Minefields or fortified bunkers

450
00:19:13.038 --> 00:19:14.759
evaporating without warning.

451
00:19:14.999 --> 00:19:17.989
According to Unit NC-13 and its commander,

452
00:19:18.279 --> 00:19:21.479
one of their most successful strikes was when they detonated a

453
00:19:21.479 --> 00:19:24.538
griffin against a lone Russian soldier on a major road,

454
00:19:24.639 --> 00:19:27.428
which caused so much panic and confusion among the Russian

455
00:19:27.428 --> 00:19:31.098
enemy commanders that they called off a full mechanized assault

456
00:19:31.359 --> 00:19:33.979
scheduled to use that same road later in the day.

457
00:19:34.159 --> 00:19:36.899
Imagine canceling an entire mechanized assault

458
00:19:37.239 --> 00:19:39.078
because one angry robot showed up.

459
00:19:39.250 --> 00:19:39.750
On the road.

460
00:19:40.130 --> 00:19:40.630
That&#x27;s a

461
00:19:40.890 --> 00:19:42.400
crazy return on investment.

462
00:19:42.650 --> 00:19:43.530
What is the bigger,

463
00:19:43.680 --> 00:19:46.479
broader implication for Operation Vivaldi?

464
00:19:46.689 --> 00:19:47.849
Blind their sensors,

465
00:19:48.000 --> 00:19:48.869
isolate them,

466
00:19:49.170 --> 00:19:51.400
and then move before they can reinforce,

467
00:19:51.689 --> 00:19:52.910
all while integrating

468
00:19:53.329 --> 00:19:54.640
new weapon systems.

469
00:19:54.969 --> 00:19:57.569
Writing for the Modern War Institute at West Point,

470
00:19:57.849 --> 00:19:58.650
Robert G.

471
00:19:58.729 --> 00:20:01.589
Rose identifies how the dispersed battlefield

472
00:20:02.010 --> 00:20:04.089
that reduces an army&#x27;s vulnerability to

473
00:20:04.089 --> 00:20:07.189
drones actually makes forces more susceptible

474
00:20:07.520 --> 00:20:09.421
to a Vivaldi style breakthrough,

475
00:20:09.620 --> 00:20:09.860
saying,

476
00:20:09.880 --> 00:20:10.220
quote,

477
00:20:10.461 --> 00:20:14.061
Russian forces are no longer ensconced behind the Sorovinkin line,

478
00:20:14.140 --> 00:20:15.531
the famous defensive line,

479
00:20:15.821 --> 00:20:19.181
with its dense minefields and multiple lines of fortifications,

480
00:20:19.500 --> 00:20:22.500
rather they&#x27;re dispersed in the broad contested zone,

481
00:20:22.740 --> 00:20:24.281
both hiding from drones

482
00:20:24.500 --> 00:20:26.461
and relying on them for early warning.

483
00:20:26.651 --> 00:20:27.681
Without drone coverage,

484
00:20:28.140 --> 00:20:30.961
many of Russia&#x27;s thinly defended positions might

485
00:20:30.961 --> 00:20:33.850
be bypassed by infiltrating forces entirely.

486
00:20:34.020 --> 00:20:34.220
OK,

487
00:20:34.301 --> 00:20:36.500
so they used Russia&#x27;s own strategy.

488
00:20:36.822 --> 00:20:40.171
Against them by realizing the whole house of cards

489
00:20:40.391 --> 00:20:42.072
was resting on drones.

490
00:20:42.462 --> 00:20:45.911
Robert Rose then points out something that frequently gets missed

491
00:20:45.911 --> 00:20:50.511
in all this discussion about kilometers traded and casualties inflicted.

492
00:20:50.791 --> 00:20:54.621
Ukrainian soldiers didn&#x27;t suddenly get better at storming trenches,

493
00:20:54.832 --> 00:20:57.771
it&#x27;s that the armed forces of Ukraine as an organization

494
00:20:57.991 --> 00:21:00.991
got better at attacking the systems around those trenches,

495
00:21:01.232 --> 00:21:02.942
like their drone and supply hubs.

496
00:21:03.192 --> 00:21:04.832
How did they organize for this?

497
00:21:05.021 --> 00:21:06.883
It&#x27;s It&#x27;s important to take note of the fact that

498
00:21:06.883 --> 00:21:10.753
the Ukrainian side organized Operation Vivaldi at the core level,

499
00:21:11.003 --> 00:21:13.162
which means they brought together multiple large

500
00:21:13.162 --> 00:21:16.542
units to attack these deep assets systematically

501
00:21:16.963 --> 00:21:19.353
instead of as isolated single strikes.

502
00:21:19.642 --> 00:21:23.662
What it means is it takes a much larger degree of command and control

503
00:21:23.883 --> 00:21:27.302
than just assigning a single regiment or brigade to a target,

504
00:21:27.642 --> 00:21:29.593
because they can continue their momentum.

505
00:21:29.802 --> 00:21:33.883
Ukraine was able to exploit those mistakes because it started thinking bigger.

506
00:21:34.053 --> 00:21:37.754
Ukraine started planning Operation Vivaldi over a year in advance,

507
00:21:38.014 --> 00:21:41.154
bringing together multiple units with particular specialties

508
00:21:41.364 --> 00:21:43.443
and training them to work closely together.

509
00:21:43.774 --> 00:21:46.693
That&#x27;s easier said than done at the scale of an army corps though,

510
00:21:46.734 --> 00:21:50.803
you&#x27;re talking about roughly 400,000 to 80,000 men for the 3rd Army Corps.

511
00:21:50.973 --> 00:21:56.093
Especially when those same units are already engaged in open warfare almost daily.

512
00:21:56.293 --> 00:21:56.874
For Ukraine,

513
00:21:57.173 --> 00:21:59.764
they are now trying to consolidate their gains,

514
00:21:59.813 --> 00:22:00.553
and first,

515
00:22:00.813 --> 00:22:02.573
you have to think about culmination point.

516
00:22:02.939 --> 00:22:03.900
But in the drone age,

517
00:22:04.000 --> 00:22:07.239
you can hit that culmination point of your advance far faster

518
00:22:07.500 --> 00:22:09.959
because now you can outrun your drone batteries.

519
00:22:10.300 --> 00:22:10.579
Second,

520
00:22:10.689 --> 00:22:12.540
you gotta think about securing the corridor,

521
00:22:12.739 --> 00:22:15.550
which means now securing more than the road behind you.

522
00:22:15.849 --> 00:22:16.260
Third,

523
00:22:16.420 --> 00:22:17.439
the support bubble.

524
00:22:17.540 --> 00:22:19.160
It has to leapfrog forward

525
00:22:19.660 --> 00:22:21.760
almost as fast as the assault force.

526
00:22:21.979 --> 00:22:24.969
And that creates a new problem for offensive warfare.

527
00:22:25.219 --> 00:22:27.810
The faster your armor and infantry move,

528
00:22:28.099 --> 00:22:31.099
the more likely it is to outrun the invisible network.

529
00:22:31.215 --> 00:22:33.306
That made that breakthrough possible.

530
00:22:33.576 --> 00:22:34.635
This footage gives us

531
00:22:34.806 --> 00:22:39.255
a ground level look at what exploiting one of those breakthroughs actually

532
00:22:39.255 --> 00:22:42.456
means when it comes to the Ukrainian infantryman and his rifle.

533
00:22:42.696 --> 00:22:45.276
The Ukrainian assault troops are clearing buildings

534
00:22:45.456 --> 00:22:47.595
by buildings in this urban warfare

535
00:22:47.776 --> 00:22:52.115
after the larger Operation Vivaldi had already pushed through in the area.

536
00:22:52.375 --> 00:22:54.926
So they start moving through ruined houses and shelters,

537
00:22:55.296 --> 00:22:57.076
calling out to see if anyone&#x27;s inside.

538
00:22:57.495 --> 00:22:58.576
They&#x27;re just doing the,

539
00:22:58.735 --> 00:22:58.895
you know,

540
00:22:58.975 --> 00:22:59.456
the minutia.

541
00:22:59.932 --> 00:23:01.791
Of consolidating gains.

542
00:23:02.212 --> 00:23:05.881
The assault team is basically a cleanup team for the Ukrainians,

543
00:23:05.891 --> 00:23:08.921
going through and mopping up any last holdouts,

544
00:23:09.011 --> 00:23:11.271
stragglers of Russian forces left behind

545
00:23:11.651 --> 00:23:13.712
as they leapfrog their positions.

546
00:23:13.972 --> 00:23:15.932
Then they reached the Russian trench line here.

547
00:23:16.092 --> 00:23:18.771
Two Russian soldiers immediately plead and surrender.

548
00:23:19.052 --> 00:23:22.141
One of them later asked the Ukrainians to take him along with them.

549
00:23:22.411 --> 00:23:24.972
Then the Ukrainians encounter another group and order

550
00:23:24.972 --> 00:23:26.612
them to raise their hands and come out.

551
00:23:26.812 --> 00:23:27.812
According to the Third Corps.

552
00:23:28.047 --> 00:23:30.468
3 Russians are given the opportunity to surrender.

553
00:23:30.758 --> 00:23:31.307
Instead,

554
00:23:31.628 --> 00:23:33.838
1 takes out a grenade suddenly,

555
00:23:34.088 --> 00:23:34.608
detonates,

556
00:23:34.647 --> 00:23:36.637
and the firefight ends the encounter.

557
00:23:36.848 --> 00:23:38.748
This is that unglamorous

558
00:23:38.968 --> 00:23:41.328
final stage of maneuver warfare.

559
00:23:41.517 --> 00:23:43.748
The breakthrough can happen kilometers away,

560
00:23:44.047 --> 00:23:44.748
but eventually,

561
00:23:44.988 --> 00:23:47.588
somebody still has to walk into every single trench,

562
00:23:47.767 --> 00:23:49.078
every single basement,

563
00:23:49.248 --> 00:23:50.187
every ruined house,

564
00:23:50.368 --> 00:23:51.108
and make sure

565
00:23:51.368 --> 00:23:53.208
that the enemy is actually gone.

566
00:23:53.608 --> 00:23:56.167
Drones have yet to take that infantryman.

567
00:23:56.524 --> 00:23:56.764
Job.

568
00:23:56.923 --> 00:23:57.543
But then,

569
00:23:57.604 --> 00:24:00.203
I noticed something strange is now happening

570
00:24:00.203 --> 00:24:02.004
across battlefields in the Middle East,

571
00:24:02.043 --> 00:24:02.644
in Yemen,

572
00:24:02.683 --> 00:24:04.104
to Thailand and Asia,

573
00:24:04.494 --> 00:24:06.994
to Sudan to Eastern Europe and Ukraine.

574
00:24:07.364 --> 00:24:10.163
Mechanized armies are once again advancing in

575
00:24:10.163 --> 00:24:12.114
all these locations across the globe,

576
00:24:12.323 --> 00:24:15.163
despite the sky being lousy with attack drones.

577
00:24:15.404 --> 00:24:17.463
The funeral for maneuver warfare

578
00:24:17.723 --> 00:24:18.624
might have been

579
00:24:18.803 --> 00:24:19.984
greatly exaggerated.

580
00:24:20.163 --> 00:24:20.764
In Myanmar,

581
00:24:20.874 --> 00:24:24.524
sweeping advances still happen despite the sky being lousy with drones.

582
00:24:25.400 --> 00:24:28.469
Step 3 is to move before they recover.

583
00:24:28.750 --> 00:24:30.300
Modern offensive pushes

584
00:24:30.479 --> 00:24:33.660
are a race to create a temporary bubble of advantage,

585
00:24:34.040 --> 00:24:36.540
exploit it faster than the enemy can recover,

586
00:24:36.800 --> 00:24:39.459
and this has always been a pillar of offensive action,

587
00:24:39.670 --> 00:24:42.260
but today it&#x27;s evolved one step further,

588
00:24:42.439 --> 00:24:45.560
where you need to also drag your own sensors

589
00:24:45.560 --> 00:24:49.119
and electronic warfare equipment and drone supply chain.

590
00:24:49.319 --> 00:24:50.900
You need to drag that all forward

591
00:24:51.479 --> 00:24:52.880
before the bubble collapses.

592
00:24:53.225 --> 00:24:54.946
And that&#x27;s what we&#x27;re seeing in Myanmar.

593
00:24:55.235 --> 00:24:59.416
Part of the reason that these assaults and maneuver warfare can happen today again

594
00:24:59.595 --> 00:25:00.095
is

595
00:25:00.276 --> 00:25:00.975
ironically,

596
00:25:01.036 --> 00:25:01.666
drones.

597
00:25:01.995 --> 00:25:04.865
Watch the sky in this footage from July 2024,

598
00:25:05.036 --> 00:25:06.885
where you can count at least four drones

599
00:25:06.885 --> 00:25:10.536
dropping bombs on the Myanmar Army&#x27;s Northeastern Command.

600
00:25:10.916 --> 00:25:14.786
The swarm coordinates to synchronize dropping several bombs at the same time,

601
00:25:15.076 --> 00:25:17.995
like in a ghost Recon Wildlands Ubisoft game.

602
00:25:18.196 --> 00:25:20.706
That&#x27;s how you blind them before isolating them.

603
00:25:20.956 --> 00:25:21.276
Myanmar.

604
00:25:21.472 --> 00:25:23.871
rebels essentially built themselves a poor man&#x27;s

605
00:25:23.871 --> 00:25:26.222
air force using commercial drone technology,

606
00:25:26.432 --> 00:25:30.192
and we saw that during their sweeping Operation 1027.

607
00:25:30.511 --> 00:25:34.401
Resistance forces swarmed junta positions with repeated bomb

608
00:25:34.401 --> 00:25:37.702
drops before those ground formations moved in.

609
00:25:37.991 --> 00:25:42.261
There were more than 2000 resistance drone strikes across 600 locations,

610
00:25:42.472 --> 00:25:45.291
becoming a surprisingly respectable air campaign

611
00:25:45.291 --> 00:25:47.812
for an organization whose procurement department

612
00:25:47.972 --> 00:25:49.651
occasionally just consists of.

613
00:25:49.748 --> 00:25:52.517
Somebody with a soldering iron in an AliExpress account.

614
00:25:52.907 --> 00:25:55.527
At this point is where the mechanized ground movement

615
00:25:55.708 --> 00:25:56.177
came in,

616
00:25:56.387 --> 00:25:58.738
moved in before the enemy could recover.

617
00:25:59.027 --> 00:26:02.328
Operation 1027 opened as this coordinated attack,

618
00:26:02.537 --> 00:26:03.508
and within two weeks,

619
00:26:03.588 --> 00:26:05.228
the Brotherhood Alliance had taken more than

620
00:26:05.228 --> 00:26:07.858
100 military positions in several towns.

621
00:26:08.108 --> 00:26:12.647
The ISS described the campaign as a rapid collapse of regime positions

622
00:26:12.767 --> 00:26:16.978
after rebels cut major highways and they isolated bases from one another.

623
00:26:17.307 --> 00:26:17.947
By June 20.

624
00:26:18.083 --> 00:26:18.654
In 2024,

625
00:26:18.744 --> 00:26:23.593
phase two kicked off when the rebel forces pushed along major roads toward Laishu.

626
00:26:24.144 --> 00:26:24.663
By August,

627
00:26:24.703 --> 00:26:28.534
they&#x27;d captured the Northeastern Regional Military Command headquarters.

628
00:26:28.573 --> 00:26:32.703
It was the first of Myanmar&#x27;s regional military commands to fall during the war.

629
00:26:32.943 --> 00:26:34.663
So mechanized maneuver warfare,

630
00:26:34.864 --> 00:26:35.553
as we&#x27;ll see,

631
00:26:35.624 --> 00:26:36.284
is often

632
00:26:36.663 --> 00:26:39.524
fighters moving in pickup trucks and some APCs,

633
00:26:39.543 --> 00:26:43.134
and then the drones help suppress isolated garrisons,

634
00:26:43.144 --> 00:26:44.663
while those mobile forces

635
00:26:44.823 --> 00:26:46.303
bypass positions.

636
00:26:46.459 --> 00:26:48.420
And severed the roads connecting them,

637
00:26:48.459 --> 00:26:50.479
and the Arkan army in Myanmar

638
00:26:50.650 --> 00:26:54.239
spent late 2024 rolling through in a sweeping advance

639
00:26:54.420 --> 00:26:58.060
by seizing the enemy junta&#x27;s Western Command headquarters after

640
00:26:58.060 --> 00:27:00.579
taking surrounding positions and cutting the command off.

641
00:27:00.819 --> 00:27:04.800
So the junta reacted by trying to deploy 20 main battle tanks,

642
00:27:04.810 --> 00:27:06.849
plus additional armored fighting vehicles,

643
00:27:07.130 --> 00:27:11.359
which was the military&#x27;s first major deployment of armor in the entire civil war.

644
00:27:11.619 --> 00:27:12.020
Meanwhile,

645
00:27:12.099 --> 00:27:14.660
navy warships offshore provided fire.

646
00:27:14.816 --> 00:27:17.526
Support while aircraft struck enemy positions.

647
00:27:17.895 --> 00:27:19.086
Drones we&#x27;re learning,

648
00:27:19.255 --> 00:27:19.595
are

649
00:27:19.735 --> 00:27:22.995
awesome for creating openings for ground troops to move through.

650
00:27:23.176 --> 00:27:26.576
It&#x27;s the yin and yang of offensive action in the modern age.

651
00:27:26.816 --> 00:27:30.156
So Myanmar shows us if you have enough mobility to arrive

652
00:27:30.416 --> 00:27:32.526
somewhere that the enemy didn&#x27;t expect you,

653
00:27:32.845 --> 00:27:34.395
you can defeat them before

654
00:27:34.696 --> 00:27:36.725
he can rebuild his defenses.

655
00:27:37.135 --> 00:27:40.215
Sometimes it means arriving in 3 pickup trucks and 14 engineers,

656
00:27:40.336 --> 00:27:41.715
students sitting in the back with

657
00:27:41.855 --> 00:27:43.015
quadcopters.

658
00:27:43.400 --> 00:27:45.439
But Sudan raises a different question.

659
00:27:45.680 --> 00:27:47.410
Once you&#x27;ve punched through the enemy&#x27;s line,

660
00:27:47.650 --> 00:27:51.640
how do you keep the breakthrough from dying on the road network behind you?

661
00:27:51.770 --> 00:27:54.810
I can&#x27;t think of another time in recent years where the front lines of

662
00:27:54.810 --> 00:27:58.359
so many different wars have yo yoed so much at the same time,

663
00:27:58.489 --> 00:28:00.829
and I think it comes down to armies learning

664
00:28:01.010 --> 00:28:02.109
how to advance

665
00:28:02.209 --> 00:28:03.550
with the very drones

666
00:28:03.689 --> 00:28:05.150
that have been keeping them in

667
00:28:05.329 --> 00:28:06.869
hiding in basements for years.

668
00:28:07.079 --> 00:28:07.260
Here,

669
00:28:07.290 --> 00:28:11.469
the Sudanese armed forces punch through the RSF positions around the city.

670
00:28:11.708 --> 00:28:12.588
In 2025,

671
00:28:12.668 --> 00:28:15.178
the frontlines of the map just suddenly started changing.

672
00:28:15.389 --> 00:28:19.088
We&#x27;ve geolocated and verified three separate videos from this advance,

673
00:28:19.348 --> 00:28:21.409
and there&#x27;s armor in the middle of this

674
00:28:21.588 --> 00:28:23.588
because it looks like Sudan remains one of the

675
00:28:23.588 --> 00:28:26.848
few places where a tank and a Toyota technical

676
00:28:27.109 --> 00:28:27.328
can

677
00:28:27.468 --> 00:28:28.948
face off against each other in combat.

678
00:28:29.068 --> 00:28:34.098
So the RSF commander Mohammad Hamdan Dagallo openly blamed the

679
00:28:34.098 --> 00:28:37.659
defeat in part on Sudanese use of Iranian drones.

680
00:28:37.909 --> 00:28:42.368
So the SAF drone footage from the Preceding months show strikes against

681
00:28:42.368 --> 00:28:46.427
RSF troops and vehicles across the region and around the capital.

682
00:28:46.738 --> 00:28:49.468
Then you&#x27;re seeing Chinese CH-95 drones

683
00:28:49.608 --> 00:28:53.088
identified operating from an RSF base in Darfur.

684
00:28:53.447 --> 00:28:57.508
So these weapons have caused a balance of power shift around the world

685
00:28:57.687 --> 00:29:02.958
that&#x27;s rewriting borders right now and allowing for massive offensive pushes.

686
00:29:03.287 --> 00:29:05.917
Here we see the M23 fighters and Rwandan

687
00:29:05.917 --> 00:29:08.407
forces are advancing into one of the biggest.

688
00:29:08.577 --> 00:29:09.886
Cities in eastern Congo,

689
00:29:10.237 --> 00:29:11.616
while Congolese troops,

690
00:29:11.866 --> 00:29:12.937
foreign contractors,

691
00:29:12.947 --> 00:29:15.227
and regional peacekeepers try to stop them.

692
00:29:15.457 --> 00:29:16.146
At first glance,

693
00:29:16.227 --> 00:29:16.796
this looks like

694
00:29:17.266 --> 00:29:19.107
another African rebel offensive.

695
00:29:19.376 --> 00:29:22.427
Then you start looking closer and you see that UN investigators

696
00:29:22.427 --> 00:29:27.046
documented all this sophisticated types of GPS jamming and spoofing equipment

697
00:29:27.266 --> 00:29:29.187
operating around the front lines.

698
00:29:29.427 --> 00:29:31.126
They were pushing up with them

699
00:29:31.327 --> 00:29:33.896
this advanced sophisticated technology.

700
00:29:34.146 --> 00:29:36.687
The interference affected Congolese military aircraft.

701
00:29:37.005 --> 00:29:38.076
surveillance drones,

702
00:29:38.365 --> 00:29:39.046
UN aircraft,

703
00:29:39.086 --> 00:29:41.316
and even military resupply flights.

704
00:29:41.566 --> 00:29:45.706
The jamming was mobile and some systems were transported on regular trucks.

705
00:29:45.885 --> 00:29:50.326
So when you see your rebel forces start using next-generation jamming technology,

706
00:29:50.656 --> 00:29:53.666
calling them by the term of ragtag militia starts

707
00:29:54.005 --> 00:29:55.946
requiring a couple of footnotes in there.

708
00:29:56.206 --> 00:29:59.365
Then the ground offensive accelerated and on January 23rd,

709
00:29:59.526 --> 00:30:04.026
the M23 and Rwandan forces attacked and 4 days later they entered Goma

710
00:30:04.166 --> 00:30:05.125
from multiple directions.

711
00:30:05.224 --> 00:30:07.385
Less than 3 weeks after Goma fell,

712
00:30:07.655 --> 00:30:10.824
the M23 rebels pushed south towards Bakuva.

713
00:30:11.214 --> 00:30:13.765
They captured an airport there and they entered the city,

714
00:30:14.064 --> 00:30:15.564
while Congolese forces

715
00:30:15.905 --> 00:30:16.494
retreated,

716
00:30:16.625 --> 00:30:19.334
withdrew with surprisingly little resistance.

717
00:30:19.584 --> 00:30:23.535
Similar advances are happening on the same continent in Ethiopia right now.

718
00:30:23.755 --> 00:30:25.545
In late September in Ethiopia,

719
00:30:25.854 --> 00:30:28.084
another major offensive broke through,

720
00:30:28.265 --> 00:30:30.885
where fighting between Ethiopia&#x27;s federal government

721
00:30:30.885 --> 00:30:33.464
and Tigrayan forces exploded across.

722
00:30:33.764 --> 00:30:34.884
Northern Ethiopia.

723
00:30:34.963 --> 00:30:37.524
So the Tigrayan forces seized airports while

724
00:30:37.524 --> 00:30:39.803
pushing into neighboring towns like Amera.

725
00:30:40.284 --> 00:30:41.423
Before the fighting started,

726
00:30:41.803 --> 00:30:44.053
they reportedly indicated the Tigrayan forces

727
00:30:44.053 --> 00:30:45.923
had moved tanks and artillery south.

728
00:30:46.134 --> 00:30:47.563
But here is where we need to talk

729
00:30:47.563 --> 00:30:50.323
about another important concept to maneuver warfare,

730
00:30:50.573 --> 00:30:51.803
which is consolidation,

731
00:30:51.923 --> 00:30:53.313
consolidating your gains.

732
00:30:53.524 --> 00:30:54.963
We&#x27;ve seen time and time again,

733
00:30:55.083 --> 00:30:58.183
advances get uno reversed when they extend too far,

734
00:30:58.524 --> 00:31:00.284
because then their momentum reversed,

735
00:31:00.323 --> 00:31:01.843
and the pro-government troops.

736
00:31:02.262 --> 00:31:03.483
Retook Almada,

737
00:31:03.782 --> 00:31:04.863
by early October,

738
00:31:05.022 --> 00:31:06.343
they were continuing forward.

739
00:31:06.572 --> 00:31:07.772
In just a week,

740
00:31:07.863 --> 00:31:09.172
a dramatic reversal,

741
00:31:09.383 --> 00:31:11.642
which is something that we&#x27;ve seen frequently recently,

742
00:31:11.902 --> 00:31:13.333
so why the reversals?

743
00:31:13.503 --> 00:31:16.802
It has to do with using drones to gain an advantage,

744
00:31:17.172 --> 00:31:18.603
and then the opposing force,

745
00:31:18.822 --> 00:31:20.162
using blunt power.

746
00:31:20.373 --> 00:31:25.483
And a great example of consolidation at work is the recent war in Yemen

747
00:31:25.743 --> 00:31:30.223
that showed maneuver warfare is alive and that fast reversals can happen in them.

748
00:31:30.482 --> 00:31:33.082
You&#x27;re seeing Houthi fighters moving along the Red

749
00:31:33.082 --> 00:31:35.312
Sea coast in pickups and armored vehicles,

750
00:31:35.322 --> 00:31:37.001
while drones cover their assault.

751
00:31:37.202 --> 00:31:40.881
Nobody told the Toyota Helix that armored warfare was obsolete.

752
00:31:41.082 --> 00:31:44.911
It&#x27;s actually close to the US Army&#x27;s new fighting doctrine with their ISVs,

753
00:31:45.041 --> 00:31:47.041
but they managed to get together about 100,000

754
00:31:47.041 --> 00:31:49.401
Houthi fighters to pull off this surprise attack.

755
00:31:49.562 --> 00:31:50.072
In September,

756
00:31:50.121 --> 00:31:52.302
the Houthis seized the historic port city

757
00:31:52.722 --> 00:31:54.322
north of Bab al-Mab Strait,

758
00:31:54.442 --> 00:31:57.781
and within days they&#x27;d retaken the remainder of the Red Sea coastline

759
00:31:57.921 --> 00:31:58.641
and islands around.

760
00:31:58.740 --> 00:31:59.291
The strait,

761
00:31:59.500 --> 00:32:01.961
which would have allowed them to threaten more shipping here.

762
00:32:02.181 --> 00:32:06.201
It was this lightning advance that brought guns onto the shores

763
00:32:06.370 --> 00:32:08.890
of this 19 kilometer wide choke point here.

764
00:32:09.100 --> 00:32:10.480
This may have been the least

765
00:32:10.581 --> 00:32:14.090
OSHA compliant combined arms formation in history if you watch it.

766
00:32:14.340 --> 00:32:15.461
When the offensive hit though,

767
00:32:15.581 --> 00:32:17.740
the Saudi-backed Yemeni units

768
00:32:17.951 --> 00:32:21.331
abandoned large quantities of their equipment during their retreat.

769
00:32:21.581 --> 00:32:24.840
That included armored combat vehicles along with tanks,

770
00:32:24.931 --> 00:32:25.421
artillery,

771
00:32:25.541 --> 00:32:27.020
and even drone jamming equipment.

772
00:32:27.310 --> 00:32:31.250
The Houthi videos showed captured hall after hall in their advance.

773
00:32:31.550 --> 00:32:33.219
Then barely a week later,

774
00:32:33.459 --> 00:32:38.209
footage came out and geolocated footage showed that the Saudi-backed Yemen

775
00:32:38.390 --> 00:32:42.510
government forces had recaptured the same territory in their own blitz,

776
00:32:42.839 --> 00:32:46.060
so the Houthis were unable to consolidate some of those gains.

777
00:32:46.349 --> 00:32:46.770
Some of it,

778
00:32:46.790 --> 00:32:49.150
I can&#x27;t show some of this combat footage because it&#x27;s,

779
00:32:49.300 --> 00:32:49.790
it&#x27;s brutal.

780
00:32:49.869 --> 00:32:52.150
They&#x27;re just running entire Houthi platoons over

781
00:32:52.150 --> 00:32:53.530
with their armored vehicles on the beach.

782
00:32:53.949 --> 00:32:56.869
It&#x27;s a typical beachgoing day in 2026.

783
00:32:57.300 --> 00:33:01.140
Here we see more of the Yemeni army knocking out Houthis with drones,

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showing us the lesson of

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00:33:02.989 --> 00:33:04.949
just because you can take some land.

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Doesn&#x27;t mean you always should.

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Here we see the Yemeni government

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00:33:09.280 --> 00:33:12.640
focusing fire with FPB drones and hunting Houthi trucks.

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00:33:12.939 --> 00:33:16.420
Saudi aircraft were also striking Houthi positions during the campaign,

790
00:33:16.880 --> 00:33:21.500
and that is very clear if we look at the tank battles between Thailand and Cambodia.

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00:33:21.760 --> 00:33:23.000
This might be the strangest.

792
00:33:23.175 --> 00:33:24.645
Tank battle of the drone age.

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00:33:24.775 --> 00:33:25.925
Inside the T Thai

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00:33:26.175 --> 00:33:27.375
M48 tank,

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00:33:27.494 --> 00:33:31.395
the crew is engaging Cambodian T-55 tanks across the border

796
00:33:31.694 --> 00:33:33.015
in December 2025,

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00:33:33.135 --> 00:33:35.535
destroying the Cambodian tank in the engagement.

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00:33:35.854 --> 00:33:37.474
These are Cold War tanks that

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00:33:37.694 --> 00:33:40.635
first entered service when color TV felt futuristic.

800
00:33:41.119 --> 00:33:42.119
But outside the turret,

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00:33:42.329 --> 00:33:46.119
there&#x27;s now advanced FPV drones and modern electronic warfare

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00:33:46.119 --> 00:33:49.369
devices that combine with surveillance systems on the battlefield.

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00:33:49.449 --> 00:33:52.920
It&#x27;s like using a VR headset connected to a Nintendo 64.

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00:33:53.170 --> 00:33:58.040
And the Cambodian forces launched over 125 FPV drones in one single day.

805
00:33:58.290 --> 00:33:59.170
Yet despite that,

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00:33:59.250 --> 00:34:00.869
the Thai armored forces

807
00:34:01.170 --> 00:34:02.900
were able to keep moving anyways.

808
00:34:03.050 --> 00:34:07.630
The Thai forces conducted ground attacks to seize and regain contested terrain

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00:34:07.890 --> 00:34:10.050
around positions like Hill 677.

810
00:34:10.510 --> 00:34:12.409
Both sides were trying to advance

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00:34:12.750 --> 00:34:16.060
forward by exploiting new abilities with their attack drones.

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00:34:16.429 --> 00:34:19.540
Modern maneuver warfare survived the drone age by evolving,

813
00:34:19.550 --> 00:34:20.860
and that&#x27;s my point today.

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00:34:20.989 --> 00:34:22.110
If you wanna learn more,

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00:34:22.270 --> 00:34:25.540
check out this episode of Ukraine&#x27;s trench clearing combat footage.

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00:34:25.790 --> 00:34:26.739
I&#x27;m Chris Cappy,

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00:34:26.918 --> 00:34:28.350
and I&#x27;ll see you in the next transmission.
